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Abstract 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the returns to frequent acquirers from 
emerging markets and analyzes the cross-country variations in cumulative abnormal returns.  
The sample consists of 5,147 transactions carried out by firms from 17 common and civil-law 
countries during the period of January 1985 to June 2008.  I find that the cumulative abnormal 
returns decline over the deal order and it is more pronounced in civil-law countries than in 
common-law countries.  There is also evidence that the premiums paid by acquirers from civil-
law countries with a first successful acquisition are higher than those from common-law 
countries.  These findings are consistent with agency problems and the hubris hypothesis, first 
introduced by Roll (1986). 
The second chapter examines the information links across futures markets in different 
nations, using Vector Autoregressive (VAR)-Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model.  
The data comprise a large set of commodity and financial futures traded in U.S., U.K., China, 
Japan, Canada, and Brazil during the period from August 1998 to December 2008.  The primary 
finding is that market interactions are relatively high for commodities for which information 
production generally is more diverse (metal commodities), while moderate for commodities for 
which information is more concentrated (agricultural commodities).  Furthermore, the strength 
and persistence of interactions among futures markets decline after excluding the most 
informative markets.  These findings indirectly support the breadth of information being a 
relevant factor in the extent of information linkage.  The results also indicate that the dynamic 
correlation in futures markets is high in most commodity and financial futures if there is a 
significant bi-directional return and volatility spillover.  Additionally, I estimate a market’s 
contribution to the price discovery process.  In general, the market that has a stronger price 
impact and a stronger volatility spillover tends to be the market that has greater contribution or 
leadership in price discovery.   
 
 
 
Keywords: Frequent acquirers, hubris, agency problem, emerging markets, CAR, futures 
markets, breadth of information, price discovery, Dynamic Conditional Correlation,  
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays.  The first essay of my dissertation examines the 
returns to frequent acquirers from emerging markets and analyzes the cross-country variations in 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  The existing literature on repeated mergers suggests that 
agency cost and the hubris behavior might have explanatory power in accounting for the 
declining returns for an acquirer involved in repeat acquisitions.  However, similar studies 
appear to be nonexistent for emerging countries.  An investigation of the emerging markets 
focusing on the agency issues is worthwhile, since emerging markets are characterized by 
generally high agency problems and poor investor protection.  By examining multiple countries, 
we can also determine whether differences in legal systems and investor protection is a factor in 
merger activities.  
This essay focuses on the implications of agency problems and hubris hypothesis on the 
returns of repeated acquirers in emerging countries.  More specifically, I compare abnormal 
returns of repeated acquirers depending on the legal environments within which these firms 
operate, using a sample of 5,147 transactions carried out by firms from 17 common and civil-law 
countries during the period of January 1985 to June 2008.  I find that the cumulative abnormal 
returns decline over the deal order and it is more pronounced in civil-law countries than in 
common-law countries.  This observation suggests that the value destructive to acquiring firms in 
civil-law counties is more pronounced than that in common-law countries in higher order deals.  
There is also evidence that premiums paid by acquirers from civil-law countries with first 
successful acquisition are higher than those from common-law countries.  These findings are 
consistent with agency problems and the hubris hypothesis first introduced by Roll (1986).   
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The second essay of my dissertation examines the information links across futures 
markets in various nations, utilizing the VAR-DCC model.  While prior studies have analyzed 
the interaction between futures markets by examining the information transmission across 
commodity markets, most of these studies examine a fairly small number of commodities and 
markets.  Additionally, reasons for variations in the futures markets’ interactions are not clear.  
No study to my knowledge examines whether or why the degree of market interaction might 
vary across markets and commodities.    
This essay examines the degree of interaction across the world futures markets in similar 
commodity futures.  The data comprise a comprehensive set of futures prices in commodity and 
financial futures traded in U.S., UK, China, Japan, Canada, and Brazil over the period from 
August 1998 to December 2008.  The commodity and financial futures include: agricultural 
futures (coffee, corn, soybeans, and wheat), metal futures (aluminum, copper, and gold), and 
financial futures (India S&P CNX Nifty index futures and Japan Nikkei 225 index futures).  
The primary finding of this essay is that the market interactions are relatively high for 
commodities for which information production is more diverse (e.g. metal commodities) and 
relatively moderate for commodities for which information is more concentrated (e.g. 
agricultural commodities).  This makes sense because production such as corn is more 
concentrated in few markets; therefore less markets interaction is expected.  Furthermore, I 
compare the persistence of interaction including and excluding the most important market; I find 
in most cases a substantial reduction in the degree of persistence when the most important 
markets are excluded.  This indirectly supports the information breadth being a relevant factor in 
the extent of information link.  While this conclusion might seem obvious, no studies to my 
knowledge quantify this.  The results also indicate that the dynamic correlation for futures 
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markets is high in most commodity and financial futures if there is a significant bi-directional 
return and volatility spillover.  Additionally, the study estimates the contribution of the price 
discovery process from different markets on the same asset.  The market that has a stronger price 
impact and a stronger volatility spillover tends to be the market that has the greater contribution 
in the price discovery process (i.e. greater futures price leadership).   
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Chapter 1 
The Performance of Frequent Acquirers: Evidence from Emerging Markets 
 
1. Introduction:  
In general, empirical papers1 on frequent corporate acquirers find that stock price 
reactions become less favorable as they acquire more and more firms.  These studies investigate 
acquisitions in developed countries and offer several hypotheses and theoretical explanations 
relating to the impact of the number of acquisitions on repeated acquirers’ performance.  For 
example, Rosen (2005) relates the declining returns for successive acquisitions to agency issues.  
He provides evidence of a positive relation between a firm with a merger program and excess 
compensation of this firm’s CEO.  Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2004) and Billett and Qian 
(2005) link declining returns of repeat acquisitions to the hubris hypothesis, first proposed by 
Roll (1986).   
The existing literature on repeated mergers suggests that agency cost and the hubris 
behavior might have explanatory power in accounting for the declining returns for an acquirer 
involved in repeat acquisitions.  However, similar studies appear to be nonexistent for emerging 
countries.  An investigation of the emerging markets focusing on the agency issues is 
worthwhile, since emerging markets are characterized by generally high agency problems and 
poor investor protection.   
Two additional reasons for taking up the issue are 1) phenomenal growth in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) activities in emerging markets, and 2) institutional differences between 
emerging versus developed markets.  The trade liberalization policies of emerging countries have 
caused domestic firms to become involved in domestic acquisitions to combat the fierce 
                                                 
1
 Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Billett and Qian, 2005; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 2004; Rosen, 2005; 
and Ahern, 2008 report a declining trend in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of repeated acquirers of public 
firms in U.S. and UK.  
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competition from abroad.  Recently, the data obtained from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
World-Wide M&As data base indicates that the M&As activity, undertaken by firms from 
emerging countries, is relatively intense in terms of value.  The total value of M&As transactions 
increased from $10.47 billion (4% of total value of world M&As transactions) in 1990 to $189.8 
billion (11% of total value of world M&As transactions) in 2007, which is a 17-fold increase 
during the period of 1990-2007.  Flanagan, Milman, D’Mello (1997) show that M&As activity in 
Latin America by local and international acquirers increased tenfold between 1984 through 1994 
because of the introduction of new economic and investment policies in emerging markets.   
The capital market in emerging countries is unique in terms of a number of institutional 
features.  These include, high information asymmetry2 (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Durnev, 
Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003; Jin and Myers, 2006), market illiquidity (Lesmond, 2005; 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005), and poor investor protection (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).  These particular market features may alter the 
documented performance pattern for repeated acquirers, since these features are likely more 
severe than the developed market despite the liberalization efforts3 that are undertaken by most 
of emerging countries. 
Although institutional differences (and issues related to this) separate emerging markets 
from developed markets, the former cannot be treated as one cohesive group as substantial 
differences (institutional, legal, political etc.) exist across emerging markets.  The institutional 
governance infrastructure in the emerging countries varies considerably across emerging markets 
                                                 
2
  Information asymmetry in this context includes:  insider trading regulations, financial disclosures, and domestic 
vs. foreign information advantages. 
3
 Since 1990, governments of emerging markets have adopted an economic reform program, which aims at 
liberalizing and modernizing their economies in order to be more competitive at the regional and international 
levels and integrating them into the world economy.  The accession to WTO, signing of new regional trade 
agreements, creating an administrative and investment climate to encourage domestic and foreign investment, and 
privatization of state owned enterprises are undertaken as major elements of the broad new economic strategy 
being followed by most emerging countries.   
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based on the legal system of individual country.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000) show that common-law countries (civil-law countries) provide high 
(low) level of protection to both shareholders and creditors4.  They also provide empirical 
evidence that different legal systems have a considerable impact on the quality of country’s 
institutions (e.g. common-law countries have better institutions, lower level of corrupt 
governments, and more efficient courts than the civil systems) and accordingly, firms in 
common-law countries rely more on stock markets to raise new capital (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997) and have less concentrated shareholder ownership (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).  Further, countries with better investor protection have a 
more active market for mergers and acquisitions than that of lesser investor protection countries 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2003).  Boubakri, Dionne, Triki (2006) show positive returns are significantly 
higher for bidder shareholders in countries where investor protection is better.  
Major objectives of this study are twofold: 1) to examine the market reaction to 
acquirers’ announcements of repeated acquisitions in emerging countries, and 2) to analyze 
whether agency problems and the hubris explanation can explain the cross-country variations in 
cumulative abnormal returns experienced by frequent acquirers.  For the second purpose, I 
examine if abnormal returns differ depending on whether the repeated acquirer resides in a civil 
law country or in a common law country.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that ownership and investor protection differ between these two legal systems.  
Several studies have confirmed the implications of the differences in the legal environment.  
                                                 
4  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) develop a new measure to quantify the degree of legal 
protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders (anti-self dealing index). The 
countries with lower scores on the index provide more opportunities for minority shareholder expropriation as 
reflected by, the anti-self dealing index for Mexico (0.17), Brazil (0.27), South Korea (0.47), India (0.58), China 
(0.78) and Hong Kong (0.96) out of 1.   
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Given this finding, the hypothesis is that agency problems and hubris behavior are more 
pronounced for a civil-law acquirer than a common-law acquirer.  Since common-law countries 
are likely to have better monitoring and investor protection, I expect that stock price reactions 
should be more positive (less negative) for repeated acquirers in common-law countries than in 
civil-law countries.  The study’s results support this hypothesis.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two reviews previous 
literature on the performance of single and multiple acquirers and the existing hypotheses used to 
explain the performance of multiple acquirers as well as the focus of this paper.  Section three 
states the data and methodology.  Section four discusses the empirical results.  Section five 
concludes the analysis. 
2. Literature Review:   
This review summarizes the studies that examine the performance of acquirers from 
developed economies and their counterparts from emerging countries, followed by a review of 
studies that are designed to examine the performance pattern of the multiple acquirers.   
2.1. M&As’ and Acquirers’ Performance:  
The literature regarding the market reaction to domestic acquisitions in developed stock 
markets has been extensively studied (Franks, Broyles and Hecht, 1977; Firth, 1979, 1980; 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988).  While a few studies have observed positive returns to acquirers 
(Franks, Broyles and Hecht, 1977; Lubatkin, 1987), most have found that acquirers either earn 
zero (Frank and Harris, 1989) or experience negative gains (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Murray, 1991).  Research on cross border 
M&As activity is also common especially in the U.S. and UK.  While some studies show 
positive returns from cross border M&As (Fatemi and Furtado, 1988; Morck and Yeung, 1992; 
Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Markides and Ittner, 1994), few studies show a negative 
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announcement period return for the bidding firms (Datta and Puia, 1995; Danbolt, 1995; Kiymaz 
and Mukherjee, 2000).   
In emerging countries, a very limited amount of research has investigated the wealth 
creation associated with the acquiring companies.  Pangarkar and Lie (2004) analyze 115 
acquisitions by Singapore firms during the period of 1990-1999 and report that the acquirers 
experience significant positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  Yao (2004) examines the 
impact of M&As’ activity on the return and future performance of 36 high-tech firm in Taiwan 
from (1996-2001) and finds that the acquirers earn short term positive abnormal returns.  Wang 
and Boateng (2007) restrict their study to Chinese acquirers who acquired foreign firms.  They 
examine the impact of acquisition announcements on shareholder wealth of Chinese listed 
companies engaged in 27 cross border M&As deals over the five year period of 2000-2004.  
They find that cross border M&As create value to shareholders of the acquirer firms and those 
acquirers earn positive cumulative abnormal returns for a two-day period.  They report that the 
cross-border acquisitions by Chinese firms are motivated by market development and power 
through increased market share and strategic knowledge sourcing.   
2.2. Performance of Repeated Acquirers:   
Most of the empirical studies concerning the performance of the multiple acquirers have 
used U.S. and UK stock market data with no emphasis being given to multiple acquirers from 
emerging countries.  In the following section, I review the studies that examine the pattern of the 
frequent acquirers in developed countries and the existing hypotheses that are offered to explain 
the pattern.  These include: agency problems and the hubris hypothesis and other hypotheses 
(liquidity discount, opportunity set hypothesis, capitalization hypothesis, and signaling theory).  
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2.2.1. Agency Problems and Hubris Hypothesis:   
The empirical results on the relevance of agency problem in acquisitions are somewhat 
mixed.  Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) report that abnormal returns associated with 
acquisition announcement by large acquirers are less than that of small acquirers.  They suggest 
that the size effect might be caused by agency issues; however, no tests have been provided.  
Ahern (2008) tests the agency cost hypothesis using the G−index derived by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) to measure the managerial entrenchment.  He finds weak support for the agency 
theory.  Croci (2005) tests for empire building as one of alternative explanations for why 
managers undertake serial acquisitions by using a sample of 591 U.S. firms that made five 
acquisitions within a five year interval over the 1990-2002.  He reports that managers undertake 
repeated acquisitions because of their superior skills.  In contrast, Rosen (2005) provides 
evidence of a positive relation between a firm with merger program and excess compensation of 
this firm’s CEO.  
The hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986) suggests that overconfident managers might explain 
negative reactions to acquiring firms.  Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007b) find that the increasing 
premiums drive down abnormal returns with their bid order.  Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes 
(2004) test the hubris hypothesis among other hypotheses (e.g. overvaluation hypothesis, and 
accounting manipulation hypothesis) by using a sample of acquisitions by UK firms during 
1984-1998.  They find empirical evidence that the decline in the acquirer’s returns occurs only 
for an acquirer whose first acquisitions is successful; successive returns actually increase when 
the first acquisition is unsuccessful.  Billett and Qian (2005) provide evidence of association 
between overconfidence and repeat acquisition decisions and report that frequent acquirers 
experience negative abnormal returns in higher order deals.  Bradley and Sundaram (2004) find 
10 
 
evidence that positive market reaction before acquisition stimulates the acquirer to make 
additional acquisitions.  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) link the agency theory with the hubris hypothesis on a 
sample of 106 U.S. large acquisitions (over $100 million).  They show that, with a high 
proportion of inside directors, the relationship between CEO hubris (measured by firm’s recent 
performance, recent media praise for the CEO, and CEO’s self importance who inherently 
believe in his/her ability) and premium paid for acquisitions becomes stronger (i.e. CEO hubris is 
more pronounced when the proportion of inside directors increases).  They further find that the 
boards with a large percentage of outside directors are best able to resist proposed acquisitions 
by CEO with hubris.  
2.2.2. Other Hypotheses:   
Other related hypotheses that are used to explain the pattern include liquidity discount, 
opportunity set hypothesis, capitalization hypothesis, and signaling theory.   
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) provide evidence that the bidder returns from 
acquiring private and subsidiary targets is higher than that of public deals because of the 
illiquidity premium.  Acquiring a public firm requires a liquidity premium which drives down 
the returns to the acquirers, particularly those purchased with stock.  The acquirer’s return 
continues to be negative through the fifth and even more acquisitions when a public target is 
acquired with stocks.  In contrast, when a target is a private firm, the acquiring firm receives a 
positive return as it is able to buy the target at an illiquidity discount regardless of the method of 
payment used.  The positive stock price reaction for the acquiring firm continues through the 
fifth or more acquisitions when the target is a private firm.  Similarly, Conn, Cosh, Guest, and 
Hughes (2005) examine the announcement returns of 4,000 acquisitions by UK public firms 
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during 1984-1998 and find that acquisitions of private targets result in positive announcement 
returns while the reactions for acquisitions of public targets are negative.   
The opportunity set hypothesis of Klasa and Stegemoller (2007) predicts that the 
sequences of the acquisition are attributed to the change in the investment opportunity set.  They 
find evidence to suggest that the acquirer’s abnormal returns decline for subsequent bids because 
of the declining investment opportunity set over time.  
The capitalization hypothesis of Schipper and Thompson (1983) suggests that the market 
capitalizes the entire benefit of subsequent acquisitions in the first announcement of the program.  
On average, a later acquisition has no return.  Using 55 U.S. firms that engage in acquisition 
programs during the period of 1952-1968, they find that the market reacts positively to the 
announcement of a merger program.  However, later acquisitions have a lower return.   
Signaling theory-based arguments have not had much success in explaining repeated 
acquirer’s returns.  Indeed, the evidence reported by Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) is 
inconsistent with the signaling prediction.  Asquith, Bruner, Mullins (1983) hypothesize that 
each subsequent deal conveys less information than prior deals since the market has learned 
more about the acquirer.  Based on a sample of U.S. firms involved in repeat mergers (up to 
four) during 1963-1979, the bidder returns remain positive through the fourth bid.  Ahern (2008) 
tests a signaling theory prediction that dispersion of returns (a measure of information 
asymmetry related to an acquisition) decreases with bid number, but he finds no significant 
reduction in dispersion.   
2.3. Focus of the Paper 
This paper focuses on the implications of agency problems and the hubris hypothesis on 
the returns of repeated acquirers in emerging countries.  More specifically, the abnormal returns 
of repeated acquirers depending on the legal environments within which these firms operate are 
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compared.  There is preponderance of evidence to suggest that investor protection is poor in 
civil-law countries.  A similar argument applies to the corporate governance system in civil-law 
countries.  Kim, Kitsabunnarat, and Nofsinger (2005), among others, find that countries with 
stronger investor protection rights have firms with more outside directors since the minority 
shareholders are weak to affect board composition.  This suggests that board characteristics in 
civil-law countries with weak investor protection is less likely to resist major acquisitions’ 
proposals or even overbidding by a CEO with hubris behavior.   
Applying the hubris hypothesis to emerging markets, the study expects that a successful 
first acquisition builds overconfidence (hubris) for the acquirer who then overpays for 
subsequent acquisitions and consequently its returns declines with each successive bid.  
Furthermore, if the hubris behavioral tendency is stronger in civil-law countries, the decline in 
subsequent performance will be more pronounced for acquirers in civil-law countries than those 
in common-law countries.  I also expect that the premium paid for acquisitions in the civil-law 
countries to be larger than those premiums in common-law countries due to the lack of sufficient 
institutional governance infrastructure in the civil-law countries.   
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1. Sample Details: 
The sample firms are identified from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database.  These firms make multiple acquisitions between January 1, 1985 and 
June 30, 2008.  Following the prior literature, only acquisitions that were completed within 1,000 
days (the time between completion date and announcement date) are included in the sample.  The 
acquirers must be in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)/ Compustat Global, thereby 
providing firm level information.  The focus of this study is with the public acquiring firms that 
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make acquisitions of public, private and subsidiary firms.  Acquirers and targets are not a utility 
or a financial institution (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  Clustered acquisitions where 
the bidder acquires two or more firms within five days have been excluded (Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller, 2002).  Daily stock prices, adjusted for dividends and splits are obtained from 
WRDS/ Compustat Global.   
The study defines a frequent acquirer as a public firm that acquires at least two targets 
within any five-year horizon over the sample period (Billett and Qian, 2005).  Deal order is 
defined based on a rolling 5-year window (Billett and Qian, 2005).  If the firm acquired five 
acquisitions within the last five year history, then the current deal order is six.  The short-term 
abnormal returns to frequent acquirers from emerging countries are examined.  These countries 
are subdivided into two groups based on differences in legal system.  These groups include 
common legal origin: Malaysia, India, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, and 
civil legal origin: South Korea, Norway, Greece, Brazil, Russia, Taiwan, China, Mexico, Poland, 
Portugal, Philippines.  They collectively account for about 85% of M&As activities that were 
undertaken by firms from emerging countries.  The rest of the emerging markets have an 
insufficient number of transactions to permit analysis after matching their extracted acquisitions 
announcements with stock price data from WRDS.  
Table 1 Panel A displays the acquisitions originating from firms in common-law 
countries while panel B shows the corresponding sample in civil-law countries.  For common-
law countries, the screening criteria results in a sample of 2,645 acquisitions made by 824 
frequent acquirers during the sample period 1985-2008.  The median number of deals completed 
by a single firm is 2.5 deals over the sample period.  Further, the median value of the total value 
of transactions is $8.15 million during the sample period.  For the breakdown of the completed 
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deals according to deal order series, Table 1 Panel A, shows that for the frequent acquirer from 
common-law countries, the first acquisition accounts for 24.08% of total completed deals, for 
second and third deals (2nd&3rd hereafter) equal 46.92%, and for the fourth deal (4th deal 
hereafter) and greater (combining all deals with a deal order of four or more) equal 29%.  Panel 
A also shows that Malaysia and India are the most important ones in terms of total number of 
deals that carried out during the study period.  In term of dollar amount, Hong Kong has the 
largest average deal size and total size.  
In contrast, Table 1 Panel B shows that the number of acquisitions carried out by civil-
law countries is 2,502 acquisitions and made by 711 firms.  This finding is consistent with (Rossi 
and Volpin, 2003) in which the volume of M&As activity is less active in countries with lesser 
investor protection.  The median number of deals completed by one firm is three deals over the 
sample period.  Further, the median value of the total value of transactions is $15.21 million 
during the sample period.  As for the breakdown of the completed deals according to deal order 
series, Table 1 Panel B reveals that for the frequent acquirer from civil-law countries, the first 
acquisition account for 21.58% of total completed deals, for 2nd&3rd acquisitions equal 41.17%, 
and for the 4th deal and greater equal 37.25%.  Panel B also shows that South Korea and Norway 
are the most important ones in terms of total number of deals that carried out during the study 
period.  In term of dollar amount, however, Mexico has the largest average deal size and total 
size.   
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Table 1 
Summary of M&As Activity for Frequent Acquirers by Country 
The table reports transaction and the final merger clean sample of frequent acquirer for each country.  Panel A and B display the summary of M&As’ activity for 
frequent acquirers from common and civil-law countries, respectively.  Each panel reports the number of deals, number of acquiring firms, the median number of 
completed acquisitions by a firm over the sample period (Jan 1985-Jun 2008), the breakdown of completed acquisitions by deal order, the total value of 
transaction that are supplied by SDC in ($ millions), and the median of transaction value for each country.  The transaction value is the total value of 
consideration paid by the acquiring firm, excluding fees and expenses.  Frequent acquirer is defined as a public firm that acquires at least two targets within any 
five-year horizon over the sample period.  Deal order defined based on a rolling 5-year window (i.e. if the firm acquired seven acquisitions within the last five 
year history, then the present deal order is eight).  N1 is the number of completed acquisitions with a deal order of one.  N2 is the number of completed 
acquisitions with a deal order of two and three.  N3 is the number of completed acquisitions with a deal order of more than three.  
Country No. of deals 
No. of 
firms 
Median 
no. of 
deal 
No. of announcements by deal order  Transaction value (mill$) 1st  2nd – 3rd  >3rd  
N1 %  N2 %  N3 %  Total Median 
Panel A: Acquirer from common-law countries  
               
Malaysia 730 256 2.00 210 28.77  403 55.21  117 16.03  12,176.67 2.35 
India 493 150 2.00 118 23.94  224 45.44  151 30.63  17,619.80 15.08 
South Africa 427 109 3.00 94 22.01  184 43.09  149 34.89  31,407.21 23.92 
Hong Kong 381 112 2.00 88 23.10  168 44.09  125 32.81  79,732.74 22.30 
Singapore 389 148 3.00 85 21.85  180 46.27  124 31.88  18,911.64 1.97 
New Zealand 225 49 3.00 42 18.67  82 36.44  101 44.89  7,616.46 13.95 
All common-law countries 2,645 824 2.5 637 24.08  1,241 46.92  767 29.00  167,464.52 8.15 
Panel B: Acquirer from civil-law countries 
               
South Korea 579 216 2.00 177 30.57  303 52.33  99 17.10  47,751.76 8.08 
Norway 548 107 4.00 68 12.41  171 31.20  309 56.39  71,390.40 17.84 
Greece 234 68 3.00 54 23.08  106 45.30  74 31.62  11,905.23 8.85 
Brazil 188 45 3.00 40 21.28  69 36.70  79 42.02  55,162.49 68.50 
Russia 177 33 6.00 15 8.47  42 23.73  120 67.80  41,533.41 68.33 
Taiwan 165 52 2.00 52 31.52  74 44.85  39 23.64  25,827.79 24.00 
China 147 72 2.00 44 29.93  82 55.78  21 14.29  16,261.67 10.65 
Mexico 145 30 4.00 21 14.48  46 31.72  78 53.79  71,521.78 63.93 
Poland 140 39 3.00 30 21.43  56 40.00  54 38.57  4,091.62 2.83 
Portugal 121 28 3.00 23 19.01  49 40.50  49 40.50  10,038.77 31.15 
Philippines 58 22 2.00 16 27.59  32 55.17  10 17.24  2,718.09 9.91 
All civil-law countries  2,502 711 3.00 540 21.58   1,030 41.17   932 37.25   358,203.01 15.21 
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Table 2 reports the distribution of M&As activity by industry for common and civil-law 
countries using the 49 Fama and French industry classifications.  In common-law countries, 
business services (9.8%), transportation (6.6%), computer software (5.8%), wholesale (5.8%), 
construction material (5.0%) and electronic equipment (4.6%), are the largest acquiring 
industries which together account for 37.6% of all multiple deals.  These industries, except the 
electronic equipment, are the most important targets for merger, accounting for 37.2% of all 
target firms in these industries.  Whereas, in civil-law countries, electronic equipment (8.0%), 
computer software (7.9%), communication (7.3%), business services (6.1%), transportation 
(5.6%) and petroleum and natural gas (4.6%), are the largest acquiring industries which together 
account for 39.5% of all multiple deals.  These industries are, also, the most important targets for 
merger, accounting for 42.9% of all target firms in these industries.  The distribution of M&As 
activity collectively indicates a similarity between acquirers from common and civil-law 
countries in making acquisitions in specific industries (business services, transportation, 
electronic equipment and computers software).  These industries are among the first top five 
attractive acquisitions targets for both groups.  This industry clustering is among the first top five 
groups in M&As activity reported in previous literature for repeated acquirers from the U.S. 
(Ahern, 2008).  
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Table 2 
M&As Activity for Frequent Acquirers by Industry 
This table summarizes the M&As activity by industry for frequent acquirers from common and civil-law countries.  
Industry data are sorted using 49 Fama and French industry classifications.  Each panel reports detailed information 
on the number of acquisitions that are carried out by common and civil-law countries in each sector.  Column (1) 
represents the ratio of frequent acquirers in one industry to all frequent acquirers.  Column (2) is the number of firms 
that make multiple bids (3) represents the ratio of firms that are targets to frequent acquirers in one industry to all 
target firms.  Column (4) is the number of firms that are targets to frequent acquirers.  Column (5) is the number of 
acquired bids from the same industry as the frequent acquirer.  Column (6) is ratio of acquired bids from the same 
industry as the frequent acquirer to all acquired bids.  
Industry sector 
Acquiring firm  Target No. of own 
industry 
acquisition 
(5) 
 
% Bids in 
own 
industry 
(6) 
% N  % N 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Acquirer from common-law countries 
Beer & Liquor 0.5 5  0.6 9 11 78.6 
Candy & soda 0.5 5  0.6 13 6 46.2 
Food products 2.8 33  3.7 58 36 49.3 
Tobacco Products 0.3 3  0.1 2 1 14.3 
Agriculture 2.5 21  1.6 27 22 33.3 
Aircraft 0.0 0  0.0 0 0 0.0 
Apparel 0.8 12  0.7 16 9 40.9 
Automobiles and Trucks 2.8 27  1.8 33 26 35.1 
Business Services 9.5 85  10.5 196 94 37.3 
Business Supplies 1.1 10  1.4 22 15 51.7 
Chemicals 3.3 33  3.6 58 47 54.0 
Coal 0.2 2  0.5 8 4 100 
Communication 5.8 36  5.1 63 85 55.6 
Computer Software 5.7 50  8.2 118 74 49.3 
Computers 1.7 13  1.1 24 9 20.0 
Construction 3.4 34  2.5 49 26 28.6 
Construction Materials 6.3 43  4.4 64 71 42.8 
Consumer Goods 2.9 24  2.4 39 38 48.7 
Defense 0.0 0  0.0 0 0 0.0 
Electrical Equipment 0.8 12  1.0 22 8 38.1 
Electronic Equipment 4.3 40  3.1 54 39 34.5 
Entertainment 1.1 10  1.1 19 9 30.0 
Fabricated Products 0.6 6  0.9 18 4 23.5 
Healthcare 0.9 5  1.1 13 17 70.8 
Machinery 1.8 18  1.6 33 4 8.3 
Measuring and Control Equipment 0.3 6  0.5 9 3 33.3 
Medical Equipment 0.0 1  0.4 9 1 100 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal 
Mining 1.6 13  2.0 27 27 62.8 
Personal Services 1.3 9  2.0 35 13 37.1 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 1.8 14  1.6 27 24 50.0 
Pharmaceutical Products 3.4 22  3.7 39 70 77.8 
Precious Metals 2.5 11  2.3 16 54 80.6 
Printing and Publishing 1.4 11  1.4 22 21 55.3 
Recreation 0.8 9  0.9 19 7 35.0 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 3.3 29  3.1 42 58 65.9 
Retail 3.6 29  3.6 61 41 43.2 
Rubber and Plastic Products 1.8 19  2.0 33 23 47.9 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0.2 1  0.3 5 3 50.0 
Shipping Containers 0.2 2  0.4 7 1 16.7 
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Table 2 continued 
Industry sector 
Acquiring firm  Target No. of own 
industry 
acquisition 
(5) 
% Bids in 
own 
industry 
(6) 
% N  % N 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Steel Works Etc 3.1 30  2.2 40 29 34.9 
Textiles 2.1 20  1.6 26 23 41.8 
Trading 0.6 6  0.2 6 2 13.3 
Transportation 6.3 57  6.5 88 107 64.5 
Wholesale 5.6 50  7.4 127 43 29.1 
Panel B: Acquirers from civil-law countries 
Beer & Liquor 1.2 9 
 
0.8 12 18 58.1 
Candy & soda 1.2 7 
 
2 23 19 65.5 
Food products 5.2 31 
 
3.5 35 64 49.2 
Tobacco Products 0.3 3 
 
0.1 1 2 28.6 
Agriculture 1.3 7 
 
1.6 24 12 37.5 
Aircraft 0 0 
 
0 1 0 0 
Apparel 0.8 7 
 
0.4 9 2 10 
Automobiles and Trucks 1.7 14 
 
1.4 24 19 44.2 
Business Services 6.4 45 
 
7.4 112 68 42.5 
Business Supplies 1.8 14 
 
1.8 25 25 56.8 
Chemicals 2.8 22 
 
3.4 51 30 43.5 
Coal 0.4 3 
 
0.6 8 6 60 
Communication 9.9 54 
 
10.6 95 185 74.6 
Computer Software 6.6 58 
 
8.6 123 89 53.9 
Computers 2.3 22 
 
2.5 44 23 39.7 
Construction 3.8 33 
 
3.9 60 61 63.5 
Construction Materials 3.7 33 
 
3.1 39 52 56.5 
Consumer Goods 1.3 17 
 
1 20 6 18.2 
Defense 0 0 
 
0 1 0 0 
Electrical Equipment 0.6 9 
 
0.8 20 2 13.3 
Electronic Equipment 6.6 59 
 
5.2 87 77 47 
Entertainment 0.6 6 
 
1.6 31 7 50 
Fabricated Products 0.3 2 
 
0.4 8 0 0 
Healthcare 0.9 3 
 
1 7 20 90.9 
Machinery 2.1 20 
 
2.8 48 21 40.4 
Measuring and Control Equipment 0.4 6 
 
0.5 10 3 30 
Medical Equipment 0.6 6 
 
0.4 7 2 14.3 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal 
Mining 1.1 7  1.4 17 15 53.6 
Personal Services 0.2 2 
 
0.8 17 4 100 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 8.8 34 
 
5.9 44 127 58 
Pharmaceutical Products 1.4 15 
 
1.7 28 20 57.1 
Precious Metals 0.1 2 
 
0.3 5 1 33.3 
Printing and Publishing 2.4 10 
 
1.2 16 17 27.9 
Recreation 2.3 15 
 
1.2 21 12 20.7 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1 10 
 
1.4 20 21 84 
Retail 2.3 16 
 
3.2 48 40 70.2 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.9 7 
 
0.8 10 10 45.5 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0.8 6 
 
1.1 14 8 42.1 
Shipping Containers 0.6 5 
 
0.4 7 6 37.5 
Steel Works Etc 5 30 
 
4.4 44 68 54.4 
Textiles 2 19 
 
1.1 16 16 32.7 
Trading 0.4 3 
 
0.2 3 0 0 
Transportation 4 41 
 
5.2 77 73 72.3 
Wholesale 3.8 26 
 
4.7 89 24 25.5 
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As for the deals characteristics of the sample, they are divided into four groups.  The 
target origin of the deal (domestic vs. cross border), the industry relatedness (if both target and 
acquirer have the same three-digit SIC code, they are considered related), the organization form 
of the target (private, public or subsidiary), and the mode of payment (cash, stock, or 
combination).  Table 3 provides sample statistics for common and civil-law countries across the 
four different levels of deal characteristics.  Relative to acquirers from civil-law countries, on 
average, acquirers from common-law countries rely significantly more on cross border 
acquisitions at the 1% level (40.8% vs. 35.9%), are significantly more involved in unrelated 
acquisitions at the 5% level (62.8.% vs. 58.1%), and have significantly more private and 
subsidiaries acquisitions at the 5% level (80.0% vs. 77.2%).  In contrast, acquirers from civil-law 
countries are significantly more likely to use mixed offer (cash or stock) to pay for their 
transactions than those from common-law countries at the 5% level (70.7% vs. 66.4%).  
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Table 3 
Sample Statistics for Frequent Acquirers across Different Deal Characteristics 
The table presents sample statistics for all completed mergers and acquisitions of multiple acquirers.  Panel A and B 
present a breakdown of completed deals with respect to target origin (domestic vs. cross border), type of transaction 
(related vs. unrelated), organizational form of the target (public, private, subsidiary), and payment method (cash, 
stock, combination) for acquirers from common and civil-law countries, respectively.  The target’s origin is 
considered domestic if the target and the acquirer located in the same country, and cross border otherwise.  
Transactions are classified as related if both target and acquirer have the same three-digit SIC code, and unrelated 
otherwise.  A target is considered public if it is listed on a stock market and private & subsidiary otherwise.  All cash 
includes transactions made only in cash, or cash and debt.  All stock defined as transactions made only in common 
stock to pay for acquisition.  Mixed offer is defined as a transaction made in cash and stock and/or convertibles, and 
method classified by SDC as “other”.  
Country  
Relatedness   Mode of payment 
Unrelated   Related All cash   All stock   Mixed 
N %   N %   N %   N %   N % 
Panel A: Acquirers from common-law countries 
  Malaysia  513 70.3 
 
217 29.7 
 
293 40.1 
 
23 3.2 
 
414 56.7 
India  238 48.3 
 
255 51.7 
 
100 20.3 
 
17 3.5 
 
376 76.2 
South Africa  245 57.4 
 
182 42.6 
 
84 19.7 
 
44 10.3 
 
299 70 
Hong Kong  241 63.3 
 
140 36.7 
 
103 27 
 
18 4.7 
 
260 68.2 
Singapore  265 68.1 
 
124 31.9 
 
138 35.5 
 
19 4.9 
 
232 59.6 
New Zealand  158 70.2 
 
67 29.8 
 
44 19.6 
 
6 2.7 
 
175 77.8 
All common-
law countries  1,660 62.8  985 37.2  762 28.8  127 4.8  1,756 66.4 
Panel B: Acquirers from civil-law countries 
South Korea  395 68.2 184 31.8 245 42.3 41 7.1 293 50.6 
Norway  329 60 219 40 100 18.3 20 3.7 428 78.1 
Greece  153 65.4 81 34.6 24 10.3 9 3.9 201 85.9 
Brazil  78 41.5 110 58.5 46 24.5 3 1.6 139 73.9 
Russia  95 53.7 82 46.3 22 12.4 2 1.1 153 86.4 
Taiwan  74 44.9 91 55.1 45 27.3 16 9.7 104 63 
China  81 55.1 66 44.9 37 25.2 1 0.68 109 74.2 
Mexico  67 46.2 78 53.8 49 33.8 1 0.69 95 65.5 
Poland  94 67.1 46 32.9 23 16.4 3 2.1 114 81.4 
Portugal  54 44.6 67 55.4 32 26.4 1 0.8 88 72.7 
Philippines 34 58.6 24 41.4 11 19 3 5.2 44 75.9 
All civil-law 
countries 1,454 58.1   1,048 41.9   634 25.3   100 4   1,768 70.7 
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Table 3 continued 
Country  
  Target origin   Organization form of the target 
National Cross border public private sub 
  N %   N %   N %   N %   N % 
Panel A: Acquirers from common-law countries 
Malaysia  576 79 154 21 96 13 400 55 234 32 
India  243 49 250 51 92 19 233 47 168 34 
South Africa  257 60 170 40 125 29 164 38 138 32 
Hong Kong  181 48 200 53 108 28 136 36 137 36 
Singapore  191 49 198 51 58 15 168 43 163 42 
New Zealand  117 52 108 48 51 23 118 52 56 25 
All Common-law 
countries 1,565 59 1,080 41 530 20 1,219 46 896 34 
Panel B: Acquirers from civil-law countries 
South Korea  473 82 106 18 179 31 315 54 85 15 
Norway  223 41 325 59 103 19 275 50 170 31 
Greece  140 60 94 40 38 16 142 61 54 23 
Brazil  130 69 58 31 42 22 77 41 69 37 
Russia  122 69 55 31 23 13 90 51 64 36 
Taiwan  103 62 62 38 55 33 53 32 57 35 
China  126 86 21 14 17 12 56 38 74 50 
Mexico  64 44 81 56 40 28 42 29 63 43 
Poland  115 82 25 18 28 20 68 49 44 31 
Portugal  62 51 59 49 29 24 48 40 44 36 
Philippines 46 79 12 21 16 28 21 36 21 36 
All civil-law 
countries   1,604 64   898 36   570 23   1,187 47   745 30 
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3.2. Announcement Abnormal Return:  
This study analyzes the performance of repeated acquirers (i.e. the market reaction to 
acquirers’ announcements) by using the event study method.  To calculate the daily abnormal 
return around the merger announcement, the study uses the modified market-adjusted model, 
which subtracts the daily market return from the daily return of each firm (Antoniou ,Petmezas, 
and Zhao, 2007; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Toeh, 2005; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 
2002 among other).  
mtitit RRAR −=                                                                                                     (1) 
Where itAR  is the abnormal return of firm i on day t, itR is the return of firm i  on day t, mtR is 
the value weighted market index return.  Next, the calculation of the daily abnormal return is 
used to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period (-2, 2) around 
the announcement of a merger deal as follows: 
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The study assesses the pattern of the CARs for repeated acquirers from common and 
civil-law countries as well as the individual countries in both groups.  After highlighting the 
CARs’ pattern, the study further investigates various factors that might explain the reported 
pattern using both univariate and multivariate framework.   
4. Empirical Results: 
4.1. CARs Trend:  
4.1.1. Univariate Analysis:  
To examine the market reaction to acquirers’ announcements of repeated acquisitions in 
emerging countries, a univariate analysis investigates the impact of deal order on acquisition 
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performance for repeated acquirers from common and civil-law countries.  The results are shown 
in Table 4.  The CARs are positive for repeated acquirers from common-law countries regardless 
of deals’ order, but the CARs decline over the deals’ order series.  In other words, the CARs are 
declining as acquirers are involved in more mergers and acquisitions.  In Table 4 Panel A, I 
report the CARs for the full sample of repeated acquirers from common-law countries as well as 
the individual countries of that group.  For all bids reported in common-law countries, the CARs 
on the first deal order (1st deal hereafter) declines from a significantly positive of 2.03% (t = 
5.16) to significantly positive of 1.11% (t = 5.15) for the 2nd&3rd deals and then to 1.03% (t = 
3.93) for the 4th and higher deal order.  The decline in CARs between the first deal and beyond 
the third deal is significant at the 5% level, and it is also significant between the first and the 
2nd&3rd deals at the 5% level.  Moreover, the declining trend in CARs of repeated acquirers also 
holds for common-law countries when considering the simple mean of the CARs for all countries 
in the sample (using equal weight for each country).  Specifically, the CARs on the 1st deal order 
declines from 2.45% (t=5.15) to 1.17% (t=5.4) for the 2nd&3rd deals and then to 1.01% (t=5.2) for 
4th and higher order.   
The same pattern is also seen for each individual country.  For example, for the Indian 
frequent acquirers, the CARs on the 1st deal order decline from a significantly positive of 2.65% 
(t = 3.85) for the 1st deal to a significantly positive of 1.06% (t = 2.30) for deals beyond the 3rd 
deal.  The decline in CARs is significant at the 1% level between the 1st deal and beyond the 3rd 
deal, and it is also significant at the 5% level between the 1st and the 2nd&3rd deals.  
In Table 4 Panel B, I report the CARs for the full sample of repeated acquirers from civil-
law countries as well as the individual countries of that group.  Similar results, some even more 
dramatic, are reported for all bids in civil-law countries.  The CARs on first deal order declines 
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noticeably from a significantly positive of 2.11% (t = 4.79) to significantly positive of 0.88% (t = 
3.54) for the 2nd&3rd deals and then lower to 0.17% (t = 0.84) for the 4th deal and more.  Decline 
in CARs between the 2nd&3rd deals and beyond the 3rd deal is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  The decline between the 1st and the 2nd&3rd deals as well as the 1st deal and beyond 3rd 
deals is also significant at the 1% level.  Further, the CARs trend also holds for civil-law 
countries when I consider the simple average of the CARs of all countries (i.e. equal weight for 
each country).  The CARs on the first deal declines from 1.87% (t = 3.81) to 0.83% (t = 4.64) for 
the 2nd&3rddeals and then to 0.017% (t = 0.09) for 4th and higher order.   
The same pattern of declining returns is also found for each individual country of civil-
law group.  For instance, the frequent acquirers from Norway experience a strong pattern of 
declining CARs; the CARs on first deal order declines from a significantly positive of 2.84% (t = 
3.38) to significantly positive of 0.51% (t = 1.66) for deals beyond the 3rd deal.  The decline is 
significant in CARs between the 1st deal and beyond 3rd deals at the 5% level.  It is also 
significant between the 2nd&3rd deals and deals beyond the 3rd deal at the 10%.  Furthermore, 
frequent acquirers from some civil-law countries (South Korea, Poland, Philippines, Mexico, and 
Greece) even experience negative CARs for deals beyond the 3rd deal.  For example, acquirers 
from Poland exhibit a strong declining trend in CARs; the CARs on first deal order decline from 
a significantly positive of 5.47% (t = 1.84) to -0.28% (t = -0.48) for the deals beyond the 3rd deal.  
The decline in CARs between the 1st deal and beyond 3rd deals is significant at the 5% level, and 
it is also significant between the 1st and the 2nd&3rd deals at the 5% level.  
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Table 4  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Frequent Acquirers by Deal Order 
This table presents the acquisitions performance of a frequent acquirer by deal order.  Frequent acquirer is a public 
firm if it acquires at least two targets within any five-year horizon over the sample period.  Deal order is based on a 
rolling 5-year window.  CARs for bidders are calculated for the five-day period (-2, 2) around the announcement 
(day 0) of a merger deal.  Daily abnormal return around the merger announcement is measured using a modified 
market-adjusted model:  
mtitit RRAR −=  
Where itR is the return of firm i on day t, mtR is the value weighted market index return.  Panels A and B contain 
CARs for the frequent acquirers from common and civil-law countries, respectively.  Each panel reports the CARs 
for the 1st bid, 2nd&3rd, and beyond 3rd deals of the frequent acquirers for each country.  The last two rows of each 
panel report the simple average of CARs of all countries and for the cross-country average (each country is equally 
weighted).  The difference between the CARs for different categories: (1st - >3rd), (1st -2nd&3rd), and (2nd&3rd - >3rd) 
are calculated.  A t-test is used to test if the mean of these differences is different than zero.  Number in parentheses 
indicates t-statistics.  a, b and c refer to significance at the 1,5,10% levels respectively.   
  
Country 
Deal order  Differences tests 
1st 
(1) 
2nd - 3rd 
(2) 
>3rd 
(3)  (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (2) – (3) 
Panel A: Common-law countries 
Malaysia 0.964 0.653 0.166  0.311 0.799 0.488 
 [2.158]b [1.886]c [0.303]  [0.537] [1.102] [0.689] 
India 2.650 1.032 1.063  1.617 1.586 -0.031 
 [3.845]a [2.649]a [2.298]b  [2.205]b [1.975]a [-0.052] 
South Africa 2.637 1.390 1.596  1.247 1.041 -0.206 
 [2.693]a [2.056]b [2.697]a  [1.060] [0.967] [-0.223] 
Hong Kong 2.355 1.898 0.913  0.456 1.442 0.985 
 [1.275] [2.329]a [1.175]  [0.261] [0.799] [0.850] 
Singapore 1.674 1.511 1.080  0.163 0.594 0.430 
 [1.963]c [3.126]a [1.201]  [0.179] [0.458] [0.455] 
New Zealand 4.421 0.518 1.236  3.903 3.185 -0.718 
 [2.106]b [0.736] [2.777] a  [2.179]b [2.104]b [-0.894] 
All common-law countries 2.038 1.115 1.031  0.923 1.007 0.084 
 
[5.161]a [5.149]a [3.928]a  [2.230]b [2.185]b [0.244] 
Cross country average  2.450 1.167 1.009  1.283 1.441 0.158 
 
[5.154]a [5.390]a [5.213]a  [2.238]c [3.783]b [0.645] 
Panel B: Civil-law countries 
South Korea 2.958 0.488 -0.253  2.469 3.211 0.741 
 [3.191]a [0.908] [-0.373]  [2.473]b [2.396]b [0.728] 
Norway 2.840 1.552 0.512  1.287 2.327 1.040 
 [3.375]a [3.072]a [1.659]c  [1.340] [3.035]b [1.857]c 
Greece 1.170 1.054 -0.401  0.115 1.571 1.455 
 [1.189] [0.863] [-0.246]  [0.063] [0.753] [0.729] 
Brazil 2.299 0.655 0.092  1.644 2.208 0.563 
 [1.037] [1.175] [0.142]  [0.896] [1.215] [0.650] 
Russia 1.300 1.530 0.682  -0.229 0.617 0.847 
 [0.840] [1.927]c [2.016]b  [-0.142] [0.5612] [1.145] 
Taiwan 0.759 0.693 0.271  0.066 0.488 0.422 
 [0.911] [1.163] [0.371]  [0.066] [0.423] [0.431] 
China -1.053 1.729 0.864  -2.782 -1.917 0.865 
 [-1.120] [1.973]c [0.625]  [-2.015]b [-1.153] [0.463] 
Mexico 1.345 0.789 -0.603  0.556 1.948 1.391 
 [0.517] [1.049] [-1.000]  [0.269] [1.101] [1.428] 
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Table 4 continued  
Country 
Deal order  Differences tests 
1st 
(1) 
2nd - 3rd 
(2) 
>3rd 
(3)  (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (2) – (3) 
Poland 5.476 0.562 -0.286  4.915 5.762 0.848 
 [1.836]c [0.730] [-0.480]  [2.036]b [2.449]b [0.867] 
        
Portugal 1.397 0.500 0.344  0.897 1.053 0.156 
 [1.429] [0.551] [0.584]  [0.604] [0.968] [0.145] 
Philippines 2.085 -0.339 -1.035  2.424 3.119 0.696 
 [2.624]b [-0.407] [-0.713]  [1.852]c [2.054]c [0.409] 
All civil-law countries 2.115 0.882 0.177  1.233 1.938 0.705 
 
[4.789]a [3.538]a [0.846]  [2.623]a [4.460]a [2.140]b 
Cross country average 1.870 0.837 0.017  1.033 1.853 0.821 
 
[3.814]a [4.639]a [0.096]  [1.765]c [3.178]a [7.099]a 
Difference test 
Common-law – Civil-law -0.077 0.233 0.853     
 [-0.131] [-0.012] [2.572]b     
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The CARs trend is also robust for common and civil-law countries regardless of the 
method of payment used.  The results are shown in Table 5.  For example, the CARs for repeated 
acquirers from civil-law countries decline from a significantly positive of 0.38% (t = 1.72) for 
the first deal to -0.08% (t = -0.55) for the 4th deal and more if the cash is used.  Similar decline 
occurs even when stock payment is used (from a significantly positive of 0.34% (t = 2.2) for the 
1st deal to significantly positive of 0.06% (t = 1.91) for the 4th or higher deals).  In the common-
law countries the CARs decline from a significantly positive of 0.68% (t = 4.4) for the 1st deal to 
significantly positive of 0.28% (t = 2.1) for the 4th deal and more if cash is used.  CARs also 
decline from 0.24% (t = 1.91) for the 1st deal to 0.09% (t = 0.77) for the 4th deal and more if 
stock is used.  Table 5 also reveals that cash payment results in higher positive abnormal returns 
than stock payment across the board in both common and civil-law countries. These findings are 
consistent with other studies (Agrawal, Jaff, and Mandelker, 1992; Franks, Harris, and Mayer 
1988; and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002) who report that bidders who use non-cash 
methods of payment to buy a public firm perform worse than cash bidders.  These results are also 
consistent with Myers and Mujluf (1984) in which the choice between cash and stock determines 
the bidder returns. 
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Table 5 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Acquirers by Deal Order and by Mode of Payment 
This table presents the acquisitions performance for frequent acquirers.  Each panel is divided by deal order and by 
the method of payment.  Deal order is based on a rolling 5-year window.  All cash includes transactions made only 
in cash, or cash and debt.  All stock defined as transactions made only in common stock to pay for the acquisition.  
Mixed offer defined as a transaction made in cash and stock and/or convertibles, and method classified by SDC as 
“other”.   
Deal order  Mode of payment 
 All cash  All stock  Mixed 
Panel A: Acquirer from common-law countries 
       
1st   0.678  0.237  1.123 
  [4.400]a  [1.914]c  [3.284]a 
2nd – 3rd   0.337  0.136  0.642 
  [2.882]a  [1.631]  [3.959]a 
> 3rd   0.284  0.096  0.651 
  [2.096]b  [0.778]  [3.437]a 
       
Panel B: Acquirer from civil-law countries 
       
1st   0.388  0.339  1.388 
  [1.724]c  [2.156]b  [4.027]a 
2nd – 3rd   0.264  0.139  0.479 
  [1.839]c  [2.554]b  [2.441]b 
> 3rd   -0.078  0.064  0.192 
  [-0.554]  [1.914]c  [1.271] 
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To conclude the univariate results, the CARs decline, on average, from deal to deal for 
common and civil-law countries, though the CARs trend is almost flat for common-law countries 
(declines from 2.03% to 1.03%), and steep for civil-law countries (declines from 2.11% to 
0.17%).  That is to say, for higher order deals, the effect is more pronounced for civil-law 
counties than for common-law countries.  The documented pattern of repeated acquirers in this 
study is consistent with the experience of repeated acquirers from the U.S. and the UK in having 
a decline returns for subsequent bids.  The pattern of declining pattern is a real phenomenon for 
both developed and emerging countries, which is even more pronounced in civil-law countries.  
Additional details on why the declining returns are more pronounced for civil countries are given 
in section 4.2.   
4.1.2. Multivariate Analysis:  
To confirm the univariate results that the CARs pattern is declining in subsequent deals, 
the study uses multiple regression analysis to investigate the role of deal order on acquirer 
performance.  Two cross-sectional regressions are estimated separately: 
εαα ++= order dealCAR 1o
     
               (3) 
εβαα +++= Xorder dealCAR 1o
                                                  
(4) 
           Equation 3 is a simple regression of the five-day CARs on deal order.  The expected sign 
of the deal order variable is negative (the CARs are declining as acquirers are involved in more 
mergers and acquisitions) due to agency problems and hubris behavior.  Equation 4 is a multiple 
regression of CARs on deal order and a set of control variables “ X ” that are used in recent 
literature (Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2004); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; 
Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2007b, Ismail, 2008; and Ahern, 2008) and represent acquirer, target, and 
deal characteristics.  These variables include number of dummies: Time between each 
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acquisition takes the value of one if the time between each acquisition is more than one year ; 
Public takes the value of one if a public firm is acquired; Private takes the value of one if a 
private firm is acquired; Tender offer takes the value of one if the acquisition is a tender offer; 
Same industry takes the value of one if the target and acquirer have the same three-digit SIC 
code; Cash takes the value of one if the transaction is made only in cash or cash and debt; Cross 
border takes the value of one if the target and the acquirer are not located in a same country; 
Hostile takes the value of one if it is hostile according to SDC; and Compete takes the value of 
one if there is more than one bidder.  Firm size which is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
acquirer’s total assets is also included.  
Table 6 reports the results for the two regressions.  The first column reports that the deal 
order in common-law countries affects negatively the CARs -0.15, and it is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  When I replace the deal order with the 2nd deal and later deals (deal 
order > 3), the results remain negative and significant on the CARs.  These results are consistent 
with the univariate results.  However, controlling for other variables, the impact of the deal order 
is still negative but not statistically significant, which shows that the inclusion of a set of control 
variables affects the evidence of the univariate analysis for common-law countries.  Among the 
control variables, only firm size has a significant coefficient at the 1% level.  Firm size is 
negatively related to the acquirer’s abnormal return and is consistent with other studies (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Billett and Qian, 2005).  
For the return regression of civil-law countries, the third column reports that the deal 
order coefficient is negative -0.18 and significant at the 1% level.  Controlling for acquiring firm, 
target, and deal characteristics, the deal order is still significantly and negatively affect CARs 
(i.e. the deal order effect still holds even with the control variables).  The results of both 
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regressions are consistent with the evidence provided by the univariate analysis that the CARs 
decline with deal order.  Among the control variables, the study finds that the acquirer’s 
abnormal return is significantly larger at the 10% level when buying a private firm which is 
consistent with other studies (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2004).   
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Table 6 
 CARs by Deal Order- Results of the Multivariate Analysis 
The table summarizes the results of regressing the five-day (CARs) on deal order and a set of control variables. 
Column one and four present the results for a simple regression of CARs on deal order for common and civil-law 
countries, respectively.  Column three and six present the results of a multiple regression of CARs on deal order and 
a set of control variables for common and civil-law countries, respectively.  Column two and five represent the 
results of CARs on the second deal, third deal and beyond 3rd deals for common and civil-law countries, 
respectively.  The control variables include a number of dummy variables: Time between each acquisition takes the 
value of one if the time between each acquisition is more than one year ; Public takes the value of one if a public 
firm is acquired; Private takes the value of one if a private firm is acquired; Tender offer takes the value of one if the 
acquisition is a tender offer; Same industry takes the value of one if the target and acquirer have the same three-digit 
SIC code; Cash takes the value of one if the transaction is made only in cash or cash and debt; Cross border takes 
the value of one if the target and the acquirer are not located in a same country; Hostile takes the value of one if it is 
hostile according to SDC; and Compete takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder.  Firm size is defined 
as the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets.  a, b and c refer to significance at the 1,5, 10% levels 
respectively.  
Dependent variable:  
CARs(-2,+2) 
 Acquirer from common-law countries  Acquirer  from civil-law countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Acquirer characteristic 
Deal order  -0.155    -0.049  -0.176    -0.156 
  [-2.06]b    [-0.59]  [-3.57]a    [-2.65]a 
Second    -0.964      -1.015   
    [-2.21]b      [-2.18]b   
Third    -0.853      -1.615   
    [-1.71]c      [-2.99]a   
> third    -1.007      -1.938   
    [-2.30]b      [-4.47]a   
Firm size       -0.438      -0.112 
      [-4.12]a      [-1.23] 
Time between each 
acquisition  
     0.182      -0.631 
     [0.53]      [-1.27] 
Target characteristic 
Public      -0.398      -0.184 
      [-0.78]      [-0.34] 
Private      -0.367      0.712 
      [-0.97]      [1.73]c 
Deal characteristic 
Tender offer      1.041      0.259 
      [1.07]      [0.25] 
Same industry      -0.076      0.117 
      [-0.22]      [0.33] 
Cash      0.208      -0.236 
      [0.55]      [-0.54] 
Cross border      0.527      -0.124 
      [1.53]      [-0.33] 
Hostile      -2.095      -3.857 
      [-0.52]      [-0.45] 
Compete      0.534      0.935 
      [0.19]      [0.26] 
Constant  1.774  2.038  3.708  1.556  2.115  2.303 
  [6.47]a  [6.31]a  [5.28]a  [6.30]  [6.13]a  [3.10]a 
R2  0.001  0.002  0.011  0.005  0.008  0.011 
N  2645  2645  2229  2502  2502  2018 
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4.2. What are the Driving Forces for a Declining Trend in CARs?  
4.2.1. The Effect of the Successful First Time Acquirer   
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2004) link declining returns of repeated acquirers to the 
hubris hypothesis and report that the decline in returns occurs only for the successful first time 
acquirers.  Hayward and Hambrick (1997) report that recent firm success fosters the hubris 
behavior.  
I follow Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2004)’s approach by examining whether the 
link between the declining returns of repeated acquirers and hubris behavior is present in 
common and civil-law countries.  Two cross-sectional regressions are estimated separately, in 
which the dependent variable is the five-day CARs:  
εααα +×++= )order (deal successfulCAR 21o dummysuccessful
                               
(5) 
εβααα ++×++= Xdummysuccessful )order (deal successfulCAR 21o
                   
(6) 
The first regression described in equation 5 follows Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes 
(2004) by introducing two dummies; the successful first acquisition (the frequent acquirer with a 
positive market reaction for the first deals), and the interaction term formed by multiplying the 
deal order by the successful dummy (deal order× successful dummy).  The successful dummy 
takes the value of one if the first acquisition is successful, whereas the interaction term takes the 
value of the deal order, if the successful dummy is equal to one.  The interaction of the deal 
order variable with the successful dummy measures the incremental impact of deal order on 
abnormal returns for the acquirers with first successful acquisition over the unsuccessful first 
acquisition.  The expected sign of the successful dummy is positive, while the interaction term is 
negative because the first time success leads to overconfidence, which results in a declining 
performance of the subsequent deals.  The second regression described in equation 6 repeats 
34 
 
equation 5 but controls for a set of control variables “ X ” (Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 
2004; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2007b; Ismail, 2008; and 
Ahern, 2008).  “ X ” variables are similar to the ones that are already used in equation 4.   
The regression results in the first column entitled “acquirer from common-law countries” 
and the third column entitled “acquirer from civil-law countries” of Table 7 indicate that the 
acquirers from common and civil-law countries with a successful first acquisition have a 
significant positive effect on CARs.  The coefficients of the successful dummy are positive and 
significant at the l% level for the acquirers from common countries and civil-law countries 5.32, 
6.25 respectively.  This suggests that the acquirer from civil-law countries who succeeds at first 
acquisition earns 625 basis points more than the acquirer who does not succeed at first 
acquisition.  In contrast, the interaction term (deal order× successful dummy) coefficients are 
negative and significant at the 1% level for acquirers from common and civil-law countries         
-0.716, -1.083, respectively.  The significant interaction coefficient suggests that the subsequent 
performance of acquirers who make successful first acquisition experience a decline rather than 
the improvement experienced by the unsuccessful first time acquirers (i.e. there is a significant 
difference in the impact of deal order on abnormal returns between the successful first time 
bidders and the unsuccessful first time acquirers).  These findings are consistent with Conn, 
Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2004). 
The regression results in the second and the fourth column of Table 7 report the results of 
the multiple regression described in equation 6.  The reported results indicate that the successful 
dummy and the interaction term remain unchanged either in their signs and significance.  The 
coefficients of successful dummy are positive and significant at the 1% level of frequent 
acquirers for common and civil-law countries 4.49, 5.58 respectively.  The interaction term 
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coefficients of frequent acquirers from common -0.57 and civil-law countries -0.89 are 
significant at the 1% level.  In other words, controlling for a variety of acquirer, target and deal 
characteristics does not change the result.  Equations 6 and 7 are estimated for each individual 
country from both groups (not reported) and the results do not change qualitatively.   
Among the control variables, the CARs for frequent acquirers from common-law 
countries are significantly affected by the firm size and the cross border dummy.  The firm size 
has a significantly negative effect of -0.431 (t = -3.39) which is consistent with Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and the abnormal return is larger and significant 0.618 (t = 
1.83) from cross border M&As which also consistent with Fatemi and Furtado (1988); Morck 
and Yeung (1992); and Markides and Ittner (1994).  In contrast, firm size is negatively affecting 
CARs for frequent acquirers from civil-law countries but it is not statistically significant.  
Buying a private firm by acquirers from civil-law countries affects positively and significantly 
0.725 (t = 1.81) their abnormal return.  These results are consistent with other studies (Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004).  
 
The study also controls for economic differences within each group of common and civil-
law countries and the main findings do not change qualitatively.  Specifically, I re-estimate 
equation 6 by adding a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country is a high-income 
economy, based on the World Bank classifications, and a value of zero if the country is a middle-
income economy.  The coefficient of the dummy is positive but not statistically significant in 
both groups.  
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Table 7  
Results of Multiple Regression of Acquisition Performance on Acquisition Characteristics 
The table summarizes the results of the multivariate analysis.  The dependent variable is the five-day Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) measured using a modified market-adjusted model.  The control variables include a 
number of dummy variables: successful first acquisition takes the value one if the first acquisition is successful; deal 
order× successful dummy takes the value of deal order if the dummy is equal to one; Public takes the value of one if 
the acquisition of public firms; Private takes the value of one if the acquisition of private firms, Tender offer takes 
the value of one if the acquisition is a tender offer; Same industry takes the value of one if the target and acquirer 
have the same three-digit SIC code; Cash takes the value of one if transaction made only in cash or cash and debt; 
Cross border takes the value of one if the target and acquirer are not located in a same country; Hostile takes the 
value of one if it is hostile according to SDC; and Compete takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder.  I 
also include firm size which is defined as the natural logarithm of the acquirer total assets.  a, b and c refer to 
significance at the 1,5, 10% levels respectively. 
Dependent variable: CARs(-2,+2) 
 Acquirer from common-law 
countries  
Acquirer from civil-law 
countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Acquirer characteristics 
         
Successful 1st  acquisition   5.323  4.498  6.254  5.581 
 [12.42]a  [9.84]a  [13.20]a  [10.50]a 
(deal order*successful 1st 
acquisition) 
 
-0.716  -0.577  -1.083  -0.895 
  [-6.87]a  [-5.33]a  [-8.48]a  [-6.48]a 
Firm size     -0.431    -0.034 
    [-3.39]a    [-0.39] 
Panel B: Target characteristic 
Public    -0.431    -0.255 
    [-0.87]    [-0.49] 
Private    -0.360    0.725 
    [-0.98]    [1.81]c 
Panel C: Deal characteristics 
Tender offer    1.292    0.572 
    [1.36]    [0.56] 
Same industry    -0.050    0.099 
    [-0.15]    [0.29] 
Cash    0.137    -0.196 
    [0.37]    [-0.46] 
Cross border    0.618    -0.032 
    [1.83]c    [-0.09] 
Hostile    -2.588    -2.170 
    [-0.66]    [-0.26] 
compete    0.512    1.048 
    [0.19]    [0.30] 
constant  -0.092  1.87  -0.326  -0.345 
  [-0.45]  [2.78]  [-1.67]c  [-0.48] 
R2  0.057  0.054  0.066  0.061 
n  2645  2229  2502  2018 
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The findings from Table 7 collectively suggest that there is a significant link between the 
declining returns of repeated acquirers and hubris behavior for common and civil-law countries, 
yet it is more pronounced in civil-law countries if we consider the larger negative impact of the 
later deals on CARs in civil-law countries, which is captured by the interaction term (deal order
× successful dummy) in equation 6, compared to common-law countries.  One possible 
explanation is that firms in common-law countries have more outside directors and operate in an 
environment where the shareholder is well protected.  This suggests that board characteristics in 
common-law countries are more likely to resist major acquisitions’ proposals by a CEO with 
hubris behavior.  
To further confirm the findings, I inspects whether the declining return is more 
pronounced for acquirers whose first acquisitions is successful.  Stated differently, the study 
examines whether the performance of successful time acquirers underperform as they go towards 
the end of the deal order series.  Table 8 shows the results of the CARs’ trend for the successful 
first time acquirers are presented.   
The results in Table 8 Panel A, reveal that the CARs, for repeated acquirers from 
common-law countries with a successful first acquisition, exhibit a declining trend from a 
significantly positive of 7.062% (t = 13.68) for first deal to significantly positive of 1.512% (t = 
4.35) for the 2nd&3rd deals, and slightly lower to significantly positive of 1.158% (t = 3.19) for 
the 4th deal and greater.  Decline in CARs between the 1st deal and beyond 3rd deal 5.904 (=7.062 
- 1.158) is significant at the 1% level.  The same pattern is also seen for each individual country.  
For example, South African frequent acquirers experience a pattern of declining CARs; the 
CARs on first deal order decline from a significantly positive of 6.67% (t = 5.54) to significantly 
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positive of 1.7% (2.19) for deals beyond the 3rd deal.  Decline in CARs between the 1st deal and 
beyond 3rd deals 6.991(= 7.378 - 0.388) is significant at the 1% level.   
The results in Table 8, Panel B, show that for repeated acquirers from civil-law countries 
with a successful first acquisition, the CARs exhibit a noticeably declining trend compared to 
that of common-law countries.  The CARs decline from a significantly positive of 7.37% (t = 
11.63) for first deal to 0.38% (t = 0.99) for the 4th deal and greater.  Decline in CARs between 
the 1st deal and beyond the 3rd deal is significant at the 1% level.  The same pattern is also found 
for each individual country.  For example, South Korean frequent acquirers experience a strong 
pattern of declining CARs; the CARs on first deal order declines from a significantly positive of 
9.7% (t = 7.57) to -1.27% (t = -1.07) for deals beyond the 3rd deal.  Decline in CARs between the 
1st deal and beyond 3rd deals is significant at the 1% level.  
The findings from Table 8 collectively suggest that the declining return for successful 
first acquisitions is more pronounced in civil-law countries.  This finding is consistent with the 
multivariate analysis result that there is a link between the declining returns of repeated acquirers 
and hubris behavior.   
In sum, these findings indicate hubris behavior and are consistent with overconfidence.  
That is to say, the first time success promotes hubris which, in turn, produces a declining 
performance of subsequent deals.  One Possible explanation for these results is that those 
successful first bidders pay a higher premium with bid order. This explanation is discussed and 
tested below for common and civil-law countries.   
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Table 8 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Successful First Time Acquirers by Deal Order 
This table presents the acquisitions performance by deal order for first successful frequent acquirers.  Frequent 
acquirer is a public firm if it acquires at least two targets within any five-year horizon.  Deal order is defined based 
on a rolling 5-year window (i.e. if the firm acquired one acquisition within the last five year history, then the current 
deal order is two).  Successful first acquisition defined as a frequent acquirer with a positive market reaction for the 
first deals, CARs for the five-day period (-2, 2) around the announcement are measured using a modified market-
adjusted model.  Panel A and B contain the calculated CARs for the successful first time acquirers from common 
and civil-law countries by deal order (1st bid, 2nd - 3rd, and beyond 3rd ), respectively.  I calculate the difference 
between the CARs for the first deal and beyond the third deal (1st - >3rd) and report the mean of this difference.  A t-
test is used to test whether the mean of this difference is different than zero.  Number in parentheses indicates t-
statistics.  a, b and c refer to significance at the 1,5, 10% levels respectively. 
Acquirer origin 
 Deal order  Difference tests 
 1st  2nd – 3rd  >3rd   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1) –  (3) 
Panel A: Acquirers from common-law countries 
Malaysia  5.395  2.076  -0.901  6.297 
  [9.646]a  [3.235]a  [-0.911]  [5.391]a 
India  7.183  0.772  1.245  5.937 
  [9.991]a  [1.545]  [2.115]b  [6.404]a 
South Africa  6.670  2.018  1.727  4.942 
  [5.542]a  [2.024]b  [2.189]b  [3.466]a 
Hong Kong  10.770  1.232  1.064  9.706 
  [4.056]a  [0.903]  [0.822]  [3.089]a 
Singapore   6.448  1.917  0.727  5.720 
  [6.616]
 
a
  [2.276]b  [0.562]  [3.392]a 
New Zealand  8.614  0.335  1.885  6.729 
  [3.632]a  [0.260]  [2.475]b  [3.232]a 
Common-law countries  7.062  1.512  1.158  5.904 
  [13.676]a  [4.354]a  [3.191]a  [8.799]a 
Panel B: Acquires from civil-law countries 
South Korea  9.706  0.676  -1.272  10.979 
  [7.568]a  [0.762]  [-1.071]  [4.503]a 
Norway   6.687  2.254  1.833  4.855 
  [7.412]a  [2.968]a  [2.009]c  [3.783]a 
Greece   6.129  3.378  1.746  4.384 
  [4.744]a  [2.695]b  [0.974]  [2.016]b 
Brazil  7.688  1.412  -0.376  8.063 
  [2.118]b  [1.937]c  [-0.599]  [3.251]a 
Russia   5.073  1.775  -1.052  6.125 
  [3.554]a  [1.113]  [-0.999]  [3.271]a 
Taiwan   4.580  0.004  0.364  4.215 
  [5.134]a  [0.004]  [0.229]  [2.416]b 
China   4.099  2.847  4.056  0.042 
  [4.413]a  [1.877]c  [2.100]c  [0.022] 
Mexico   8.135  -1.213  0.603  7.532 
  [1.548]  [-0.672]  [0.405]  [1.652] 
Poland   11.865  -0.457  -0.487  12.352 
  [2.506]b  [-0.606]  [-0.286]  [1.944]c 
Portugal   4.309  1.038  -0.555  4.863 
  [3.840]a  [0.548]  [-0.678]  [3.579]a 
Philippines  3.311  -1.906  NA  NA 
  [4.617]a  [-1.245]     
Civil –law countries   7.378  1.170  0.388  6.991 
  [11.630]a  [3.055]a  [0.996]  [8.668]a 
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4.2.2. Pattern in Merger Premium:  
The hubris hypothesis predicts that early success leads to managerial overconfidence and 
overpays in subsequent deals (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 
2004; Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2007b).  To test for hubris hypothesis prediction, this study 
investigates whether the premium paid by an acquirer for a public target increases with a deal 
order when the first acquisition is successful.  Based on the relationship between the degree of 
investor protection in a given country and the performance of acquirers from emerging markets, 
the premiums paid by a frequent acquirer in common-law country with a successful first 
acquisition is likely to be less than that by an acquirer in a civil-law country.  The difference in 
the premium paid for acquisitions between the acquirers from the common and civil-law 
countries is due to the lack of sufficient institutional governance infrastructure (e.g. laws and 
regulations) in civil-law countries.  
To examine the hubris hypothesis, two cross-sectional regressions are estimated 
separately in which the premium paid to target (only available for a public firm) is the dependent 
variable:  
εαα ++= order dealPremium 1o
                         
(7)
     
εβαα +++= Xorder  dealPremium 1o
                                    
(8) 
The first model described in equation 7 is a simple regression of the acquirer premium for 
the first successful acquisition on deal order.  The premium is calculated as the transaction value, 
as reported by SDC, divided by the market value of the target four weeks prior to the 
announcement date (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). 
The second model described in equation 8 is a multiple regression of the premium on the 
deal order and a set of control variables.  The control variables include deal characteristics with 
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the same specifications as in the recent studies (e.g. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004).     
“ X ” reflects a number of dummy variables in equation 8:  Same industry takes the value of one 
if the target and acquirer have the same three-digit SIC code; Cash takes the value of one if 
transaction made only in cash or cash and debt; Tender offer takes the value of one if the 
acquisition is a tender offer; Hostile takes the value of one if it is hostile according to SDC; and 
Compete takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder.  Other independent variables 
include deal order, Ln(equitybidder), and Ln(equitytarget).  Ln(equitybidder) is the natural logarithm 
of the acquirer market equity four weeks prior to the announcement date.  Ln(equitytarget) is the 
natural logarithm of the target market equity four weeks prior to the announcement date.  The 
natural logarithm is used to capture any variation in firm size.  Table 9 reports the results for the 
two regressions.  
The regression analysis in the first column and the third column of Table 9 reports the 
results of the equation 7.  These results indicate that the premium increases with bid order for the 
first successful time acquirers for common and civil-law countries.  The coefficients of the deal 
order for first successful time acquirers are positive and significant for both groups.  However, 
the coefficient for civil-law countries 2.536 is significantly higher than that of common-law 
countries 0.084 at the 5% level.  This suggests that the premium paid by an acquirer in a 
common-law country is less than that in a civil-law country.  These results are consistent with 
hubris hypothesis that the successful first bidders pay a higher premium with bid order.   
After repeating the estimation of equation 7 with a set of control variables, the coefficient 
of the deal order for acquirers from civil-law countries remains positive and significant 2.91 at 
the 10% level.  In contrast, the correspondent coefficient for acquirers from common-law 
countries is positive 0.05 but it not significant (t = 0.83).  The mean difference between the 
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coefficients 2.864 (= 2.916 - 0.052) is significant at the 10% level even after controlling for a 
different set of variables used in prior studies.  These results are consistent with hubris 
hypothesis that the premium paid by civil-law countries’ acquirers is higher than that of 
common-law acquirers.  The control variables have the same impact on premium that is 
consistent with prior studies (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004).  The CARs for frequent 
acquirers from common-law countries is significantly affected by Ln(equitybidder), Ln(equitytarget), 
and the tender offer.  Ln(equitybidder) has a significant positive effect 0.223 (t = 2.08), and 
acquirer’s abnormal return is larger 0.813 (t = 1.94) if the form of acquisition is a tender offer.  
Moreover, the Ln(equitytarget) has a significant negative effect on CARs for frequent acquirers 
from common-law countries with -019 (t = -1.69) and civil-law countries with -6.963 (t = -3.53) 
since large targets are difficult to integrate them into acquirer’s activities.  The negative 
coefficient on Ln(equitytarget) supports the previous evidence by Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004).   
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Table 9 
 Multivariate Analysis:  Regressions of Bidder Premium for the First Successful Acquisition on Deal Order 
The table summarizes the results of the multivariate analysis.  The dependent variable is the bidder premium for the 
first successful acquisition.  Premium paid to target (only available for public firm) is calculated as the transaction 
value, as reported by SDC, divided by the market value of the target 4 weeks prior to the announcement date.  The 
independent variables include a number of dummy variables: Same industry takes the value of one if the target and 
acquirer have the same three-digit SIC code; Cash takes the value of one if transaction made only in cash or cash 
and debt; Tender offer takes the value of one if the acquisition is a tender offer; Hostile takes the value of one if it is 
hostile according to SDC; and Compete takes the value of one if there is more than one bidder.  Other independent 
variables include deal order, Ln(equitybidder), and Ln(equitytarget).  Deal order is defined based on a rolling 5-year 
window (i.e. if the firm acquired one acquisition within the last five year history, then the current deal order is two).  
Ln(equitybidder) is the natural logarithm of the acquirer market equity four weeks prior to the announcement date.  
Ln(equitytarget) is the natural logarithm of the target market equity four weeks prior to the announcement date.  For 
each variable, I calculate the difference (Column1 – Column3) and (Column2- Column4) and report the mean of 
these differences.  A t-test is used to test whether the mean of these differences is different than zero.  a, b and c 
refer to significance at the 1,5,10% levels respectively. 
Dependent 
variable: 
premium 
 Acquirers from 
common-law countries  
Acquirers from civil-law 
countries  Difference tests 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) – (3)  (2) – (4) 
             
Deal order  0.0846  0.052  2.536  2.916  -2.451  -2.863 
  [1.97]b  [0.83]  [2.39]b  [1.70]c  [-2.37]b  [-1.76]c 
Ln (equitybidder)    0.223    2.872    -2.648 
    [2.08]b    [1.19]    [-1.05] 
Ln (equitytarget)    -0.190    -6.963    6.773 
    [-1.69]c    [-3.53]a    [2.86]a 
Same industry    0.210    7.133    -6.922 
    [0.54]    [0.92]    [-0.81] 
Cash    -0.139    -8.851    8.712 
    [-0.38]    [-1.16]    [1.05] 
Tender offer    0.813    2.733    -1.920 
    [1.94]c    [0.22]    [-0.17] 
Hostile    -0.506    1.930    -2.253 
    [-0.32]    [0.05]    [-0.06] 
Compete    0.184         
    [0.23]         
Constant  0.411  -0.174  -4.201  17.171     
  [2.12]b  [-0.23]  [-1.02]  [1.25]     
             
R2  0.028  0.144  0.042  0.196     
n  133  85  134  92     
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4.2.3. Time Interval between Successive Acquisitions:   
Up to this point, I provide evidence that that premium paid to target increases with deal 
order for both civil and common-law countries, though the premiums paid by acquirers from 
civil-law countries with first successful acquisition are higher than those from common-law 
countries. These findings are consistent with hubris hypothesis predictions. 
The hubris hypothesis also predicts that the returns decline the shorter the time between 
each acquisition (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 2004; 
Aktas, Bodt, and Roll, 2007b).  The probability of success in integrating subsequent acquisitions 
declines when the interval declines between successive acquisitions.  To examine if the sample 
data is consistent with this prediction, the study calculates the time interval between subsequent 
acquisitions as the frequent acquirers with a first successful acquisition approach the end of the 
deal series.  The results in Table 10 reveal that the interval between successive acquisitions for 
frequent acquirers declines over the deal series in both common and civil-law countries.  In 
common-law countries, the mean time interval between two deals declines from 26.9 months 
(between the first and second acquisition) to 10 months (for the ninth acquisitions and more).  In 
contrast, the mean time interval for civil-law countries goes from 19.2 months (between the first 
and second acquisition) to 8.9 months (for the ninth acquisitions and more).  The frequent 
acquirers, toward the end of the deal series, are making deals faster than at the beginning of the 
series. This finding is consistent with the hubris prediction hypothesis in both groups.  
Furthermore, the time interval between the first and the second acquisition for civil-law countries 
is less than that for common-law countries (26.9 months vs. 19.2 months) which may indicate 
that the hubris behavior is higher even among frequent acquirers in civil-law countries at the 
beginning of the deal series.  
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Table 10 also shows that the acquisitions carried out with more than one year from the 
previous acquisition are declining with the number of deals in both common and civil-law 
countries.  For acquirers from common-law countries, the percentage of acquisitions that carried 
out with more than twelve months declines from 69.5% for the first and second acquisition to 
36.5% for the 9th acquisition and more.  Whereas, the corresponding percentage in civil-law 
countries declines from 55.9% for the first and second acquisition to 29.5% for the 9th acquisition 
and more.  This implies that the acquirers from civil-law countries, motivated by greater hubris 
than in common-law countries tend to acquire in a shorter period of time in later deals.  
Therefore, the abnormal returns for the common-law countries are more positive than that of 
civil-law countries.   
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Table 10  
Time between Subsequent Acquisitions by Number of Deals: TBA Pattern  
This table presents the time interval between successive acquisitions for frequent acquirers in common and civil-law 
countries.  Column (1) refers to the number of days between two subsequent deals.  Column (2) refers to the number 
of months between two subsequent deals. Column (3) refers to percentage of acquisitions that carried out with more 
than twelve months from previous acquisition by deal number.   
Number of 
deals 
Panel A: Acquirer from common-law 
countries  Panel B: Acquirer from civil-law countries 
 
 
Days 
(1) 
 
 
Months 
(2) 
% of acquisition 
carried out with more 
than twelve months 
(3) 
 
 
 
Days 
(4) 
 
 
Months 
(5) 
% of acquisition 
carried out with 
more than twelve 
months 
(6) 
        
1st - 2nd 806.7 26.9 69.5  578.4 19.2 55.9 
2nd - 3rd 879.5 29.3 67.4  648.9 21.6 55.3 
3rd - 4th 598.1 19.9 58.2  502.8 16.7 50.0 
4th - 5th 630.5 21 60.5  422.2 14.1 50.8 
5th - 6th 376.7 12.5 42.1  373.7 12.4 51.4 
6th - 7th 308.6 10.3 43.2  398.8 13.3 46.7 
7th - 8th 397.3 13.2 48.0  220.1 7.3 52.4 
8th - 9th 329.0 11 50.0  392.9 13 60.0 
9th - >10th 301.3 10.0 36.5  267.5 8.9 29.5 
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5. Conclusion:   
The study aims at examining the market reaction to acquirers’ announcements of repeated 
acquisitions in emerging countries and analyzing whether agency problems and the hubris 
explanation can explain the cross-country variations in cumulative abnormal returns experienced 
by frequent acquirers.  I hypothesize that the agency problems and hubris behavior are more 
pronounced for a civil-law acquirer than a common-law acquirer.   
The cross section analysis of a sample of frequent acquirers from 17 common and civil-
law countries shows that the CARs decline from deal to deal, though the CARs trend is almost 
flat for common-law countries, and steep for civil-law countries.  This observation suggests that 
the value destructive to acquiring firms from civil-law counties in higher order deals is more 
pronounced than those from common-law countries.  
The study further investigates whether the declining trend in CARs is a sign of hubris 
with subsequent deals by examining the performance of successful time acquirers from common 
and civil-law countries as they go towards the end of deal order series.  The study finds that the 
decline in the subsequent performance of the acquirers from civil-law countries is more 
pronounced than acquirers from common-law countries because the premiums paid by a firm in a 
common-law country are less than the premiums paid by an acquirer in a civil-law country.  The 
premium paid for acquisitions in the civil-law countries might be larger than those in common-
law countries due to the lack of sufficient institutional governance infrastructure in emerging 
countries.  
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The study also finds evidence that the acquirers from civil-law countries, motivated by 
hubris, in relative to common-law countries tend to acquire in a short period of time in later 
deals.  Therefore, the abnormal returns for the common-law countries are more positive than that 
of civil-law countries. 
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Chapter 2 
 Analyzing Information Linkage across Futures Markets 
 
1. Introduction: 
Prior studies analyze the interaction among futures markets by examining the information 
transmission across commodity markets.  Their empirical investigation focuses on the relation of 
return and volatility across markets.  However, most of these studies analyze a very limited set of 
commodities and very few of them examine whether the strength of information link might differ 
across markets.  Within this limited amount of research, Fung, Leung, and Xu (2003) examine 
patterns of information flows for three commodity futures (copper, soybeans and wheat) traded 
in both U.S. and China markets.  They find that the U.S. futures market plays a dominant role in 
transmitting information to the Chinese market.  Further, the interaction between the two markets 
is strong for the commodities copper and soybeans that are subject to less government regulation 
and fewer import restrictions in China.  For the heavily regulated and subsidized wheat 
commodity, the authors’ empirical results indicate that the U.S.-China futures markets are highly 
segmented in pricing.  These results imply that regulations and market distortions impact the 
information link of wheat futures.  Lien and Yang (2006) find that the return and volatility 
spillovers between the two copper futures markets of London Metal Exchange (LME) and New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) are bi-directional in general, but significantly stronger 
when the NYMEX operates at the electronic trading system.  In addition, returns and volatility 
spillovers between LME and Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) is bi-directional; however, the 
volatility spillover effect is uni-directional from SHFE to NYMEX.   
While prior studies have analyzed the interaction between futures markets by examining 
the information transmission across commodity markets, reasons for variations in futures 
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markets interactions are not clear.  By examining a larger set of commodities and markets, this 
study hopes to provide more insight to the nature of the interaction.  
More specifically, the hypothesis is that the interaction across futures commodities 
markets is affected by the breadth of information.  The rationale is that the more diverse the 
information production, the stronger the interaction or information transfer among markets.  
Further, the direction of information transfer will tend to come from markets where most 
information is produced.  In metal commodities, the information production is diverse and does 
not concentrate on one country.  Thus, the futures prices of copper5, for example, are affected by 
production around the world rather by a single country.  In contrast, in the orange juice market, 
the production concentrates on one location, namely Orlando.  Thus, the futures prices of orange 
juice should be primarily affected by the production and weather in Orlando6.  Similarly, the 
supply of the Brazilian coffee7 (the world's largest producer and exporter) should have a large 
impact on the futures prices in the U.S., UK and Japan coffee futures markets.  Information 
production for copper would be much broader than those of orange juice or coffee.  The 
information required to price the latter is more concentrated, thereby suggesting less market 
interaction.  Stated differently, the broader the information production, the markets should be 
more integrated. 
                                                 
5 
 Brunetti and Gilbert, 1995 find that the futures prices of copper are affected by speculative pressures, and hedging 
activity.  
6
 Roll (1984) argues that the weather in a relatively small region in Florida (Orlando) is a major determinant of 
supply and thus of futures prices.  He examines the relation between Florida orange juice futures (FCOJ) returns 
and temperature surprises, and finds a statistically significant relation; however, the coefficient of determination 
(R2) is between 1% and 4%. By using a nonlinear, state dependent model of the relation between FCOJ returns 
and temperature, Boudoukh, Richardson, Shen, and Whitelaw (2007) find that the freezing temperature around 
Orlando explains approximately 50% of the return variation.  
7
 Coffee trees in Brazil are highly sensitive to frost and drought, leading to the spread of infectious diseases which 
reduces the number of trees available for production, thus driving up prices.  Whereas the global consumer 
demand for coffee is relatively stable (see, for example, Wasserman, 2002). 
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To examine the importance of breadth of information and information production, I use a 
set of commodities and markets that are larger than the previous studies, which is one of the 
main contributions of this study.  To measure information link, I estimate the return and 
volatility spillover for commodity and financial futures that are traded in multiple markets, both 
developed and emerging markets.  Specifically, the commodities examined here include 
agricultural futures: coffee, corn, soybeans, and wheat, metal futures: aluminum, copper, and 
gold, and financial futures: India S&P CNX Nifty index futures8 (Nifty index hereafter) and 
Japan Nikkei 225 index futures (Nikkei 225 hereafter).  Examining these products across 
different markets can provide insight on whether return and volatility transmission of a 
commodity vary with the breadth of information required to price the commodity.  
Additionally, I estimate the extent of contribution of price discovery (i.e., the extent of 
the feedback provided by each futures market).  Harris, Mclnish, Shoesmith and Wood (1995) 
examine the contribution of stock price information for IBM in New York, Midwest, and Pacific 
Stock Exchanges.  They find that IBM prices on the Midwest and Pacific Exchanges adjust to 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) prices, and vice-versa.  However, NYSE contributes more to 
price discovery.  I employ their empirical method to estimate contribution of each market.  
However, the methodology requires the markets to trade at the same time. Consequently, this 
part of research analyzes a smaller set of commodities.  I investigate three sets of closely related 
markets that are open at the same time: wheat futures traded on Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
(MGE) of U.S. and Winnipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE) of Canada; aluminum futures traded 
on Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TCE) of Japan and SHFE of China; and the Nifty index traded 
on National Stock Exchange of India (NSI) and Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX). 
                                                 
8
 S&P CNX Nifty Index include 50 of the 1,300 companies (as of Dec 31, 2007) listed on the National Stock 
Exchange of India and capture almost 60% of its stock market capitalization.  Nifty index traded since 1996. 
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In summary, I use a comprehensive set of commodities and markets, allowing a richer set 
of testing market interactions.  The results generally support my hypothesis that the breadth of 
information plays a role in the intensity of market interaction.  For example, I compare the 
persistence of interaction including and excluding the most important market, I find that when 
the most important market is excluded, the persistence of interaction drops substantially.  This 
indirectly supports information breadth being a relevant factor in the strength of information link.  
While this conclusion might seem obvious, no study to my knowledge quantifies this.  As 
another example, I find the degree of interaction between markets is generally lower for 
agricultural futures than for metals futures.  This makes sense because the world supply of 
agricultural products such as corn tends to be more concentrated in few markets (particularly the 
U.S.), and therefore less markets interaction is expected.     
The next section reviews the related literature, followed by section three which states the 
data and methodology.  Section four discusses the empirical results.  Section five concludes the 
analysis.   
2. Literature Review:   
Understanding information flow between markets is important for asset valuation, risk 
sharing, and economic policy.  Previous journal articles have examined information flow across 
equity markets, commodity futures, and financial futures.  The bulk of research focuses on 
studying the direction of information flow to identify which markets influence the other.  The 
following review highlights the studies that examine the information flow across commodity 
futures, financial futures, and stock markets.  
Several papers explore price linkages across markets with similar contracts.  Booth and 
Ciner (1997) find a price and volatility relationship between corn futures traded at CBOT and 
Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) for the 1993–1995.  They find that intraday returns on CBOT corn 
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futures significantly affects overnight returns of the TGE corn futures.  TGE is dependent on the 
CBOT for information generation and is expressed in opening price of TGE, which is an 
indication that the CBOT is the dominant market in the information transmission mechanism.   
Booth, Brockman, and Tse (1998) investigate the wheat futures traded on the CBOT and 
the WCE of Canada and analyze the degree of information spillover between the futures 
exchanges of the two countries.  The results show that both the U.S. and Canadian wheat futures 
prices are related in the long run (co-integration relationship) despite the fact that Canadian 
wheat is used for animal consumption only and U.S. wheat is primarily for human consumption. 
However, the results indicate that the WCE of Canada is dependent on CBOT, while the CBOT 
is not dependent on WCE.  Extending the analysis of Booth et al. (1998), Yang, Zhang, and 
Leatham (2003) study the price and volatility transmission of wheat futures for three 
international wheat markets: the U.S., Canada, and the European Union (EU) for the 1996-2002 
period.  They find CBOT and WCE wheat futures markets influence each other.  However, the 
influence of CBOT on WCE is greater than that of WCE on CBOT, indicating that the U.S. is a 
price leader in the wheat market.  The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) 
for EU is not affected by CBOT and WCE markets.  However, LIFFE has limited influence on 
CBOT prices.  They further find that volatility transmission is from LIFFE to the CBOT and 
WCE, but CBOT does not transmit volatility to the other two markets.  Also, the volatility 
transmission is uni-directional from WCE to CBOT.  They conclude that evidence from the price 
and volatility transmissions indicates no clear leadership role in international wheat markets.  
Xu and Fung (2005) investigate the metal futures by looking at the gold, platinum, and 
silver futures contracts in the U.S. and Japanese markets to examine information flows between 
the futures exchanges of the two countries for 1994-2001.  The pricing transmissions are strong 
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across the two markets for these precious metals contracts, but information flows appear to lead 
from the U.S. market to the Japanese market in terms of returns, indicating the leadership role of 
the U.S. market in the precious metals trade.  They further find that the volatility spillover 
feedback effects are strong between the markets, and their impacts are comparable and similar.  
Analyzing the two copper futures markets LME and NYMEX, Lien and Yang (2006) find 
that the effect of NYMEX’s electronic trading system causes a much stronger return and 
volatility spillovers, compared to NYMEX’s floor trading system.  When the copper futures for 
LME and SHFE of China are considered, significant bi-directional returns and volatility 
spillovers occur. 
Hua and Chen (2007) use Johansen's co-integration test, error correction model, the 
Granger causality test, and impulse response analyses to examine the relationship between the 
Chinese futures prices and their world counterparts of copper, aluminum, soybeans, and wheat.  
They find a long run relationship between the futures prices on the SHFE and the futures prices 
on the LME for both copper and aluminum contracts.  SHFE is dependent on LME with 
feedback.  Long run relationship for soybeans futures prices between Dalian Commodity 
Exchange (DCE) of China and CBOT exists, however, the relationship for wheat futures prices 
on the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE) of China and CBOT is not existent.  This 
finding is consistent with the protection policy of the Chinese government for wheat, and with 
the empirical results of Fung, Leung, and Xu (2003) who indicate that the U.S. and China 
markets are segmented in the wheat futures market.  Hua and Chen (2007) further find that 
Dalian soybeans futures is dependent on CBOT with a feedback impact on CBOT futures.  
In a study of a different type of market interaction, Holder, Pace, and Tomas III (2002) 
investigate the volume relationship between corn and soybeans futures for contracts traded at 
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CBOT's overnight electronic trading system (so-called Project A), and two Japanese exchanges, 
namely, (TGE) and the Kanmon Commodity Exchange (KCE), now called the Kansai 
Commodities Exchange.  They find a complementary volume relationship between corn and 
soybeans futures contracts on the TGE and KCE.  They also find limited evidence of an effect on 
Japanese contract volumes by the introduction and availability of trading on Project A.  The 
introduction of trading on Project A should not be viewed as a direct competitive threat for the 
other exchanges in Japan. 
Fung, Leung, and Xu (2003) examine the effect of government policies on information 
flows patterns for three commodity futures (copper, soybeans and wheat) traded in both U.S. and 
China futures markets by utilizing the bivariate vector autoregressive (AR)-Generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH).  They argue that the interaction 
between the U.S. and China markets is expected to be weaker for highly regulated commodities, 
whereas market forces play a more prominent role when commodities are subject to fewer 
government restrictions.  The results indicate that the U.S. has a strong impact on the pricing of 
Chinese copper and soybeans futures but no pricing interaction for wheat futures.  The authors 
provide an explanation for these results based on a government protection program9.  The 
protection program is more applicable to wheat than to copper and soybeans.  These policies 
weaken the interaction between the U.S. and China markets, and indeed the results indicate that 
the two markets are segmented.  The less protected copper and soybeans products have more 
interaction between U.S. and China commodity futures markets, with the U.S. futures market 
playing a dominant role in transmitting information to the Chinese market.  
                                                 
9
 The protection policy of the Chinese government to wheat includes import restrictions (e.g. quota, tariffs and 
taxes), and a heavy subsidization program for Chinese farmers and producers. 
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Several papers examine price linkages among agricultural commodity futures prices in a 
country.  Malliaris and Urrutia (1998) examine long run and short run relationships among six 
U.S. agricultural commodity futures contracts (corn, wheat, oat, soybeans, soybean meal, and 
soybean oil) that are traded on CBOT for 1981-1991.  They find long run interdependence 
between the six commodity futures.  Two explanations for the long run co-movements are 
provided, which are common economic fundamentals (i.e., the substitutability and 
complementarity of the agricultural commodities, global demand shocks10, and weather factors), 
and the excess co-movement hypothesis (the presence of herding in the financial markets) of 
Pindyck and Rotembeg (1990).   
Booth and Ciner (2001) examine which of these two explanations better clarifies the long 
run co-movements of agricultural commodity futures by testing the price linkages among four 
commodity futures (corn, redbean, soybeans, and sugar).  These commodities are traded on TGE 
of Japan for the 1993-1998.  They find no support for the long run interdependence between the 
four commodity futures.  However, they find a long run relationship between corn and soybeans 
prices because both commodities are grown in the U.S.  The result is consistent with common 
economic fundamentals and not herding behavior.   
Dawson and White (2002) investigate the interdependencies between all major 
commodity futures contracts (barley, cocoa, coffee, sugar, and wheat) on LIFFE using 
Johansen’s (1988) procedure for co-integration for 1991-2000.  Although barley and wheat are 
expected to be related because they are substitutes in demand and supply, the authors find no 
long run relationships and no interdependence between the five commodity futures on the 
LIFFE.  Dawson, Sanjuán, and White (2006) re-examine the long run relationship between 
                                                 
10
 As Malliaris and Urrutia (1998) noted: “……one should mention exogenous shocks such as the Soviet Union 
grain policy shift of the early 1970s and the European Economic Community’s emphasis on self-sufficiency in 
the 1980s”.  
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barley and wheat prices by using Johansen, Mosconi, and Nielsen's co-integration procedure that 
permits structural breaks.  They find that the barley-wheat futures market is perfectly integrated 
and the barley price Granger-causes the wheat price.  They justify the new result by the 
significant break in October 2000 following Common Agricultural Policy11 price intervention.  
Kim and Doucouliagos (2005) calculate the realized volatility and co-variation for the 
returns of grain futures markets (corn, soybeans and wheat) for the 1999- 2004.  They find a 
positive relationship among the three grain futures returns.  They further find strong dynamic 
interactions among the volatilities and correlations estimates that indicate rich spillover effects 
among the grain futures markets.  
In financial futures, Fung, Leung, and Xu (2001) examine the patterns of information 
flows between U.S. and Asian markets for three financial futures contracts (Nikkei 225 listed in 
the U.S. and Japan, Eurodollar futures listed in U.S. and Singapore, and dollar-yen currency 
futures listed in the U.S. and Japan).  They find that the U.S. market plays a leading role across 
futures markets in transmitting pricing information, indicating that their results do not support 
the home-bias hypothesis12 that home market should be dominant in information transmission.  
They also find that foreign markets play a relatively more important role in volatility spillover, 
implying that volatility information is coming primarily from offshore markets.  Put differently, 
their results confirm the important role the U.S. market plays in transmitting information to the 
other market (i.e., international financial center).  However, Tse (1998) examines Tokyo 
Euroyen and Chicago Eurodollar futures data and finds that there is no evidence for volatility 
spillover between the U.S. and Japanese markets.  
                                                 
11 Common Agricultural Policy is a system of European Union agricultural subsidies. 
12The home-bias phenomenon suggests that information flows between markets primarily go out from the home 
market (i.e., the home country plays a leading role in information transmission across markets). See, for example, 
Shyy and Lee (1995). 
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In the stock market, the results on volatility spillovers show that the information affecting 
return and trading volume flows from a more active market to a less active one.  Studies on 
information transmission document a bi-directional transmission of returns and volatility 
between developed equity markets (e.g., Hamao, Masulis, and Ng, 1990; Koutmos and Booth, 
1995), and uni-directional transmission from developed to emerging equity markets (e.g., Liu 
and Pan, 1997).   
Wang and Firth (2004) test for return and volatility transmissions across four nearby 
emerging stock markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Shanghai and Shenzhen and three developed 
markets in New York, London, and Tokyo.  Their empirical results indicate the existence of uni-
directional contemporaneous returns, the dependence of emerging Chinese markets on New 
York, London and Tokyo stock markets, and the bi-directional volatility spillover effects 
between the developed and the emerging markets.  
Some studies have shown no informational role between markets.  Niarchos, Tse, Wu, 
and Young (1999) examine the international information flow between the U.S. and Greek 
stocks, but they find no support for spillovers between these markets for the conditional mean 
and variance equations.  U.S. and Greek stock markets are not related to each other, either in the 
short-run or in the long-run.  
3. Data and Methodology:  
3.1. Sample Details:   
The futures data used in the study consist of daily futures prices for the commodity 
futures and financial futures over the period from August 1998 to December 2008.  These data 
are purchased from Commodity System Inc (CSI) (www.csidata.com).  The data sets include 
open, high, low, and close prices, as well as volume and open interest for multiple contracts of 
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each commodity futures.  The generation of a single time series for futures contracts uses the 
nearby contract but switches to the second nearby contract one month prior to expiration.   
To examine the interaction across futures markets, I estimate the pattern of information 
flows across world futures markets (U.S., UK, China, Japan, Canada and Brazil).  All 
commodities, available from the data source, that are traded in multiple markets are examined.   
Specifically, I cover different groups of commodity futures; agricultural futures 
commodities: coffee, corn, soybeans, and wheat, and metal futures: aluminum, copper, and gold.  
In addition, the study covers stock index futures, namely India Nifty index and Japan Nikkei 225.   
Coffee futures are traded on NYMEX/CSCE of U.S., LIFFE13 Connect (London), 
Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F), and TGE of Japan.  Corn futures are traded 
on CBOT of U.S., LIFFE Connect, DCE of China, and KCX of Japan.  Soybeans futures are 
listed on CBOT, TGE, DCE, and BM&F.  Wheat futures are traded on MGE of U.S., WCE of 
Canada, LIFFE Connect, and Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE) of China.  Aluminum 
futures are traded on NYMEX/COMEX, TCE of Japan, and SHFE of China.  Copper futures are 
traded on NYMEX/COMEX and SHFE.  Gold futures are traded on NYMEX/COMEX, TCE, 
and SHFE.  Nifty index is listed on NSI of India and SGX of Singapore.  Japan Nikkei 225 is 
listed on Osaka Security Exchange (OSE), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and SGX.  
Appendix 1 reports the contract specifications of commodity and financial futures across world 
futures markets.   
To make the data of futures prices series comparable across world futures markets (U.S., 
UK, China, Japan, Canada and Brazil), the quotation units are consolidated for the data series 
and the daily prices are adjusted to U.S. dollars using daily exchange rate provided by Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS).  For example, the quotation unit for corn futures contracts is 
                                                 
13
 LIFFE is now a part of Euronext..   
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cents per bushel (on CBOT), Euro per metric ton (on LIFFE Connect), Japanese yen per ton (on 
KCX), and Chinese yuan per metric ton (on DCE).  The entire quotation unit is converted into 
U.S. dollar per bushel for all corn futures contracts.  Additionally, the stock index futures are 
also adjusted to exchange rate (see Appendix 2). 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on daily futures returns.  Non-matching data 
caused by the holidays in the world futures markets is excluded to make the data for futures 
prices series more comparable.  The numbers of daily observations are 2277, 971, 685, 1046, 
1147, 1204, 212, 655, and 2478 for coffee, corn, soybeans, wheat, aluminum, copper, gold, Nifty 
index, and Nikkei 225 futures, respectively. 
The distribution of the daily futures returns is non-normal according to the Jarque-Bera 
(J-B) test (the null hypothesis of normality is rejected by Jarque-Bera test) and characterized by a 
significant kurtosis and skewness for all futures series.  The daily futures returns in most cases 
are negatively skewed.  The kurtosis and skewness coefficients indicate that the non-normality is 
mostly due to excess kurtosis (fatter tails than the normal distribution) rather than the skewness 
since the skewness coefficients are close to zero compared to kurtosis coefficients that are 
outside the range -3 to +3 (see Table 1).   
The price series is tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit 
root tests (where I include an intercept with a trend term and an intercept without a trend term).  
Consistent with the previous literature, the study’s results suggest that the futures prices series 
are non-stationary (the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected in the logarithm of futures 
price series) and their first differences are stationary (see Table 2).  This means that the use of a 
return measure for the commodities in the GARCH model is supported.  
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Table 1 
 Summary Statistics on Daily Futures Returns 
This table summarizes sample statistics on daily futures returns.  Daily returns of coffee, corn, soybeans, wheat, 
aluminum, copper, gold, S&P CNX Nifty, and Nikkei 225 futures are calculated as the difference in daily natural 
logarithmic of futures prices.  The dataset used in this study is the daily closing futures price.  The Jarque-Bera 
statistic is distributed as χ² and tests for normality; the null hypothesis is that the data set is similar to the normal 
distribution.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, respectively. 
  Obs. Mean Variance Min Max skewness kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Agricultural Futures: Coffee Contracts 
U.S. 2277 3.00E-05 5.80E-04 -0.135 0.322 1.155a 18.169a 31828.03a 
UK 2277 6.00E-05 3.80E-04 -0.130 0.122 -0.064 4.619a 2026.00a 
Brazil 2277 7.00E-05 5.10E-04 -0.137 0.343 1.554a 28.277a 76775.80a 
Japan 2277 -3.00E-05 7.10E-04 -0.124 0.186 0.289a 2.557a 652.15a 
Agricultural Futures: Corn Contracts 
U.S. 971 6.40E-04 4.60E-04 -0.237 0.089 -1.467a 16.430a 11269.73a 
UK 971 2.80E-04 2.60E-04 -0.199 0.080 -1.889a 27.820a 31890.94a 
China 971 4.70E-04 8.00E-05 -0.051 0.052 0.8478a 7.077a 2142.53a 
Japan 971 2.70E-04 2.80E-04 -0.154 0.186 1.350a 27.016a 29823.85a 
Agricultural Futures: Soybeans Contracts 
U.S. 685 7.67E-04 4.27E-04 -0.229 0.071 -2.276a 23.613a 16482.43a 
China 685 4.62E-04 9.04E-04 -0.201 0.127 -0.612a 9.525a 2628.64a 
Japan 685 4.62E-04 5.59E-04 -0.201 0.127 -0.612a 9.525a 2628.64a 
Brazil 685 6.78E-04 2.70E-04 -0.202 0.067 -2.766a 33.221a 32327.19a 
Agricultural Futures: Wheat Contracts 
U.S. 1046 8.65E-04 3.43E-04 -0.163 0.093 -0.550 a 8.574a 3254.25a 
Canada 1046 9.28E-04 2.26E-04 -0.062 0.088 0.449a 3.166a 471.76a 
UK 1046 3.91E-04 2.77E-04 -0.253 0.060 -4.79a 66.551a 196857.80a 
China 1046 2.63E-04 8.00E-05 -0.042 0.112 2.749a 30.436a 41651.70a 
Metal Futures: Aluminum Contracts 
U.S. 1147 -1.00E-05 2.90E-04 -0.107 0.055 -0.702a 3.763a 771.00a 
China 1147 -1.10E-04 1.40E-04 -0.059 0.073 -0.416a 3.898a 759.03a 
Japan 1147 -3.00E-05 2.80E-04 -0.188 0.056 -2.597a 25.175a 31578.90a 
Metal Futures: Copper Contracts 
U.S. 1204 2.50E-04 5.40E-04 -0.209 0.116 -0.778a 8.263a 3556.07a 
China 1204 2.20E-04 3.30E-04 -0.077 0.074 -0.322a 1.005a 71.91a 
Metal Futures: Gold Contracts 
U.S. 212 -9.00E-05 4.20E-04 -0.060 0.086 0.339b 1.565a 25.68a 
China 212 -2.10E-04 3.90E-04 -0.077 0.070 -0.614a 2.281a 59.28a 
Japan 212 2.00E-05 5.60E-04 -0.080 0.062 -0.405b 1.384a 22.69a 
Financial Futures: S&P CNX Nifty(India) Index Contracts 
SGP 655 1.77E-03 9.70E-04 -0.367 0.194 -2.607a 40.031a 44409.70a 
India 655 1.73E-03 1.39E-03 -0.445 0.201 -2.914a 40.951a 46473.48a 
Financial Futures: Nikkei 225 Contracts 
U.S. 2478 -2.34E-04 3.05E-04 -0.108 0.164 0.080c 8.067a 6716.85a 
SGP 2478 -7.70E-05 2.92E-04 -0.111 0.124 -0.018 4.461a 2053.08a 
Japan 2478 -7.40E-04 3.14E-04 -0.132 0.166 -0.017 7.955a 6526.29a 
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Table 2  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root  
The table presents the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test.  The ADF includes intercept without 
trend term and both intercept and trend term.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, respectively.   
Market   Price Series   Return Series 
    Intercept Trend and Intercept   Intercept Trend and Intercept 
Agricultural Futures: Coffee Contracts 
U.S. -2.002 -2.590 -49.847a -49.848a 
UK -0.911 -1.857 -35.016a -35.091a 
Brazil -1.539 -2.130 -48.661a -48.662a 
Japan   -1.960 -2.386   -46.140a -46.145a 
Agricultural Futures: Corn Contracts 
U.S. -1.203 -1.551 -30.325a -30.317a 
UK   -1.155 0.026   -29.384a -29.462a 
China -1.028 -1.758 -30.970a -30.966a 
Japan   -1.093 -0.751   -18.385a -18.395a 
Agricultural Futures: Soybeans Contracts 
U.S. -1.156 -0.803 -27.935a -27.945a 
China -1.148 -0.206 -24.970a -25.006a 
Japan -1.265 -0.961 -26.488a -26.502a 
Brazil   -1.244 -0.402   -24.513a -24.548a 
Agricultural Futures: Wheat Contracts 
U.S. 0.081 -1.763 -31.349a -31.382a 
Canada 1.181 -1.468 -31.389a -31.568a 
UK -0.077 -2.521 -29.659a -2975330a 
China   -0.172 -1.113   -33.751a -33.823a 
Metal Futures: Aluminum Contracts 
U.S. -1.395 0.115 -37.785a -37.952a 
China -1.270 -0.059 -30.623a -30.744a 
Japan   -1.221 0.759   -37.925a -38.112a 
Metal Futures: Copper Contracts 
U.S. -1.262 0.809 -38.719a -38.979a 
China   -1.386 0.814   -31.130a -31.424a 
Metal Futures: Gold Contracts 
U.S. -1.734 -2.582 -13.172a -13.141a 
China -1.713 -2.362 -13.117a -13.090a 
Japan   -1.093 -2.920   -15.885a -15.848a 
Financial Futures: S&P CNX Nifty(India) Index Contracts 
Singapore -2.425 -1.339 -25.107a -25.252a 
India -2.299 -1.190 -25.615a -25.754a 
Financial Futures: Nikkei 225 Contracts 
U.S. -1.415 -1.451 -54.573a -54.565a 
Singapore -1.501 -1.496 -53.550a -53.542a 
Japan   -1.533 -1.528   -54.805a -54.795a 
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3.2. Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model:  
The study uses the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) framework developed by 
Engle (2002).  The model allows for a time-varying correlation rather than the Bollerslev (1990) 
constant conditional correlation (CCC) estimator.  The extracted dynamic conditional 
correlations can be used to identify the interdependence and volatility transmission across futures 
that are listed in different futures markets since the dynamics correlation are modeled in 
conjunction with those of the volatility of the series.  This model is suitable because it directly 
infers the cross-market dynamic correlations (international correlations), which are not constant 
over time (Berben and Jansen, 2005).  The DCC is a two step model.  In the first step, the 
conditional volatilities from a univariate GARCH model for each individual futures price series 
are estimated.  In the second step (dynamic correlation part), the standardized version of the 
residuals estimated from the first step is used to estimate the parameters of the conditional 
correlation.   
To model the dynamic relationships across futures markets, the Vector Autoregressive 
VAR(p)-DCC model is used, which can be presented as follows:  
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In the mean return equation of this model, tir ,  is a )1( ×N vector of the
 
log difference of 
futures prices for each series; p is
 
lag order of VAR model, C  is the )1( ×N  vector whose 
elements are constants; φ  is a )( NN × matrix of the coefficients on the past returns; and 1−tI is the 
past information until time 1−t .  Whereas, in the variance covariance structure of this model tR
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is a )( NN ×  time varying correlation matrix, and
 
tD  is a )( NN ×  diagonal matrix of time 
varying standard deviations obtainable from univariate GARCH processes given as follows: 
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The elements on its main diagonal of tD are the conditional standard deviations of the 
returns on each futures series ( tNh , ) and can be written as (i.e., GARCH(1,1) process):    
2
1,1,, −− ++= tiitiiiti hh εγθω , where Ni ,,1 K=               (3) 
where tih ,
 
is the conditional volatility, 2 1, −tiε
 
are the past squared errors, and iω , iθ , iγ are 
coefficients.  
Volatility spillover and co-movement, as in (Fratzscher, 2001; and Balasubramanyan, 
2004), is incorporated into the conditional variance model ( tih , ) to capture the volatility linkage 
effects across the futures price series.  The study defines cross market lagged squared error as 
spillover and contemporaneous cross market squared error as co-movement.  The distinction 
between spillover and co-movement is via the order of exchange market closing times.  For 
example, if the influence of Japanese market on U.S. traded futures is studied, 2
,tJPNε  is 
considered as “co-movement” because the Japan market affects the U.S. market on the same day, 
and the U.S market affects the Japanese market on the following calendar day (i.e., Japanese 
market on day t closes before the U.S. market opens on day t).  Appendix 3 gives an overview of 
the trading hours in Greenwich Mean Time for futures markets.  With the spillover and co-
movement effect, the conditional variance equations ( tih , ) can be rewritten as:   
4342143421
comovment
k
tkik
spillover
j
tjijtiitiiiti hh ∑∑ ++++= −−− 2,2 1,2 1,1,, ελελεγθω , Ni ,,1: K                (4) 
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where j refers to countries that have no overlapping trading hours with market i , while k
 
refers 
to countries that have longer overlapping trading hours with market i . 
Engle’s (2002) DCC structure can be presented as:     
1*1* −−
= tttt QQQR                                                                                                                                              (5) 
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(6) 
where Q is the unconditional correlation matrix of su' ; tititi hu ,,, /ε= (standardized error from 
GARCH), α and β  scalars representing the recent co-movements and the persistency of the 
correlation between two futures series, respectively.  α and β are nonnegative scalar parameters 
satisfying 1<+ βα  to insure that tH is positive definite (mean reverting DCC).  If α and β
 
are 
zero, one obtains the CCC model (Bollerslev, 1990) and tQ is simplyQ .  Moreover, α and β
 
are the only two parameters that drive the dynamics of all the correlations (Jondeau, Poon, 
Rockinger, 2007).  
As for tR ,
 
it can be written as:
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where ijρ  is the conditional correlation.  ijρ
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=ρ ) indicates the extent to which 
covariance between two futures series is related to the market’s individual variance.   
 
To estimate conditional covariance matrix ( tH ) parameters:  
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I use a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator over the parameters of the model 
(Engle, 2002):   
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where ),( κϕ=Ψ ; ),,,,,,,,,,,( 111111 NNNNNNNNcc λγθωφλγθωφϕ L= ; ),( βακ =  
Estimation of the model occurs in two steps since the log-likelihood function above has 
two parts namely, the volatility part in ( tD ) and the correlation part in ( tR ).  In the first stage, 
the log-likelihood function is maximized only over the parameters in volatility component, while 
in the second stage, the correlation component of the likelihood function is maximized given the 
estimates of the ( tD ) that results from the first stage.  All computations are carried out using 
WinRats software.  
I estimate a number of futures series together with the same underlying commodities 
using VAR-DCC(1,1) model.  For example, in the case of trivariate VAR-DCC )3( =N , the 
mean conditional equations can be written:   
71 
 
ttttt
ttttt
ttttt
rrrcr
rrrcr
rrrcr
,31,3331,2321,1313.3
,21,3231,2221,1212.2
,11,3131,2121,1111.1
εφφφ
εφφφ
εφφφ
++++=
++++=
++++=
−−−
−−−
−−−
            
(10) 
The variance conditional equations with volatility spillover are presented as follows:    
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The DCC parameter vector for this case (N=3) is 29x1 while it is 46x1 parameter vector for the 
case of four markets ).4( =N
 
3.3. Price Discovery in Futures Markets:   
The study examines the contribution of one market to the price discovery of other 
markets (i.e., the contribution of each market to price discovery process).  A market contributes 
to price discovery process if the feedback provided by that market drives prices in the other 
market.  For example, if the prices on WCE of Canada adjust to CBOT prices, then U.S. is 
contributing to the price discovery.  Two common approaches have been used to estimate price 
discovery, the common factor components of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Harris et al. 
(1995, 2002), and the information share of Hasbrouck14 (1995).  Both approaches provide 
measures for price discovery based on the vector error correction model (VECM).  Prior studies 
estimate the price discovery for equity markets.  This study examines the relative contribution of 
one market to price discovery of other market for commodity futures, which represents another 
contribution of the study.  
The methodology can be applied only to markets that are open at the same time.  
Therefore, the sets of markets examined here are smaller.  Specifically, the study examines the 
price discovery of wheat futures traded on MGE of U.S. and WCE of Canada; aluminum futures 
                                                 
14Hasbrouck (1995) termed the market’s contribution to price discovery as the market’s information share (i.e., a 
market’s relative proportion to the innovation variance of the efficient price). 
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traded on TCE of Japan and SHFE of China; and Nifty index traded on NSI of India and SGX of 
Singapore.  These markets have overlapping trading hours (informational-linked markets) and 
their futures prices are co-integrated of order 1.  The series that are integrated of order zero are 
excluded (e.g. corn, soybeans, and gold futures that are traded in China and Japan).  
To assess this contribution, the error correction approach used by Harris et al. (1995) is 
employed.  First, unit root tests are performed for prices of each commodity futures to see 
whether price series are integrated of order 1.  Then, the Johansen (1988) method is used to 
confirm the co-integration of prices for each commodity futures, and to find the number of co-
integrating vectors.  For example, mtP  and ntP  are the futures prices for market m and n, 
respectively for a specific commodity futures.  To be able to estimate the error correction model, 
the mtP  and ntP  series should be non stationary and integrated of order 1, denoted as )1(I .  
Moreover,  mtP  and ntP  are co-integrated if there is a linear combination between the two price 
series ntnmtm PP γγ +  that is stationary.  
The error correction model (ECM) shown below is performed for each commodity 
futures:  
∑∑
=
−
=
−−−
+∆+∆+++=∆
Q
q
m
t
n
qtq
Q
q
m
qtq
n
t
nm
t
mm
o
m
t PPPPcP
11
11 )( εηδυτ
                              
(12) 
∑∑
=
−
=
−−−
+∆+∆+++=∆
Q
q
n
t
n
qtq
Q
q
m
qtq
n
t
nm
t
nn
o
n
t PPPPcP
11
11 )( εηδυτ                                       (13) 
Where mtP∆  and ntP∆  are the first log difference of the futures prices for market m and n , 
respectively.  nυ  is the co-integrated vector coefficient between the two markets such that 
n
t
nm
t
m PP 11 −− + υυ  is co-integrated of order 1, denoted by )1(I .  Q  is the number of the lags in the 
model based on multivariate Schwarz Bayesian criterion.  The coefficient of the error correction 
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term mτ  and nτ (adjustment coefficients) indicate the responsiveness of the price series to any 
deviation from the equilibrium relationship (i.e., the deviation of price difference between the 
market m and n from zero).   
By estimating the magnitudes of the response of the market m ( nτ ) and market n ( mτ ), 
the relative contribution of one market to the price discovery process (i.e., share in price 
discovery) by following Schwarz and Szakmary (1994) can be calculated:  
m
 
market share in price discovery = 
mn
n
ττ
τ
+
=Θ
          
(14) 
 Where mn ττ +  represents the total adjustment to restore the equilibrium relation of 
prices.  A higher value of Θ reflects a larger contribution from the market m.  Similarly, the 
higher the value of Θ−1 , the larger the contribution of market n.   
4. Empirical Results:   
4.1. Summary of the Markets  
Markets vary substantially in terms of size and liquidity.  Table 3 summarizes the means 
of the Amihud daily illiquidity measure and the modified measure version of Amihud 
(Hasbrouck, 2005) for financial and commodity futures.  Amihud daily illiquidity measure is 
calculated as: 610×
id
id
DVOL
R
 (i.e., the absolute percentage price change, idR  per million dollars of 
trading value, idDVOL ), whereas, the modified measure version of Amihud can be calculated as:  
Amihud
= 
610×
id
id
DVOL
R
. 
Both measures give similar results for the level of market liquidity.  The U.S. is ranked 
on top in all commodity futures except aluminum and copper; whereas, China ranked first in the 
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two aforementioned commodities.  India and Japan are ranked first, based on liquidity, in Nifty 
index and Nikkei 225 index, respectively.  
Table 3 also summarizes the daily trading value in million dollars for commodity and 
financial futures (as a proxy measure of market size) and reports the mean of daily growth rate of 
trading volume during the study period.  Table 3 reveals that the following markets experience 
the highest growth rate in dollar trading volume (of roughly 4% a year): Aluminum and Nikkei 
225 in U.S., Wheat traded in Canada, and Copper in China.  Other markets’ growth rate is often 
less than 1%.  The fast growth in some futures traded in the U.S. is somewhat surprising in spite 
of its relatively mature market; it suggests that liquidity begets additional liquidity.  
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Table 3  
Market Liquidity and Market Size 
This table summarizes the means of the Amihud daily illiquidity measure and the modified measure version of 
Amihud (Hasbrouck, 2005) for commodity and financial futures.  Countries ranked based on liquidity; “1” being the 
most liquid market and “3” being the least liquid market.  The table also lists the daily trading value in million 
dollars for commodity and financial futures  and reports the mean of daily growth rate of trading volume (%).   
Market 
Amihud Ratio 
 
 
Modified Amihud 
 
 
Trading Volume 
 
Mean 
Illiquidity 
Rank 
Liquidity 
 
Mean 
Illiquidity 
Rank 
Liquidity 
 
Mean (US 
Millions)  
Rank 
Liquidity 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
Agricultural Futures: Coffee Contracts  
U.S. 4.94E-11 1 
 
6.16E-06 1 
 
467 1 0.15 
UK 3.87E-10 2 
 
1.68E-05 2 
 
67 3 0.16 
Brazil 2.90E-09 4 
 
2.97E-05 4 
 
24 4 0.26 
Japan 4.31E-10 3 
 
1.74E-05 3 
 
85 2 0.12 
Agricultural Futures: Corn Contracts  
U.S. 1.54E-11 2 
 
3.35E-06 2 
 
1,320 1 0.07 
UK 9.38E-09 4 
 
6.50E-05 4 
 
4 4 1.89 
China 1.02E-11 1 
 
2.68E-06 1 
 
823 2 0.08 
Japan 3.36E-09 3 
 
4.28E-05 3 
 
13 3 0.21 
Agricultural Futures: Soybeans Contracts  
U.S. 9.76E-12 1 
 
2.65E-06 1 
 
1,850 2 0.05 
China 2.18E-11 2 
 
3.28E-06 2 
 
2,630 1 0.31 
Japan 2.66E-10 3 
 
1.35E-05 3 
 
92 3 0.15 
Brazil 4.29E-09 4 
 
5.04E-05 4 
 
6 4 0.53 
Agricultural Futures: Wheat Contracts  
U.S. 9.61E-11 1 
 
8.82E-06 1 
 
168 1 0.09 
Canada 8.39E-08 3 
 
1.92E-04 3 
 
1 4 3.28 
UK 2.98E-09 2 
 
4.41E-05 2 
 
7 3 0.59 
China 1.51E-08 4 
 
7.85E+02 4 
 
45 2 1.11 
Metal Futures: Aluminum Contracts  
U.S. 4.00E-02 3 
 
1.33E-01 3 
 
4 3 4.85 
China 2.24E-05 1 
 
3.94E-03 1 
 
810 1 0.87 
Japan 3.13E-03 2 
 
2.49E-02 2 
 
14 2 0.30 
Metal Futures: Copper Contracts  
U.S. 2.20E-07 1 
 
4.14E-04 2 
 
93,800 2 0.08 
China 4.08E-07 2 
 
2.65E-04 1 
 
355,000 1 3.16 
Metal Futures: Gold Contracts  
U.S. 1.25E-06 1 
 
1.01E-03 1 
 
13,500 1 0.05 
China 2.97E-05 3 
 
4.29E-03 3 
 
786 3 0.32 
Japan 1.37E-05 2 
 
3.07E-03 2 
 
1,720 2 0.12 
Financial Futures: S&P CNX Nifty(India) Index Contracts  
Singapore 4.79E-02 2 
 
8.78E-02 2 
 
53 2 0.94 
India 7.40E-06 1 
 
2.33E-03 1 
 
1,800 1 0.15 
Financial Futures: Nikkei 225 Contracts  
U.S. 7.21E-03 3 
 
3.14E-02 3 
 
112 3 3.66 
Singapore 8.81E-06 2 
 
2.49E-03 2 
 
2,280 2 0.08 
Japan 2.34E-06 1 
 
1.30E-03 1 
 
7,050 1 0.05 
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4.2. DCC Model Results:   
The model is estimated by maximizing the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator over the 
parameters of the model (Engle, 2002), following the algorithms of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (BFGS).  In the following subsections, the overall results of VAR-DCC model are 
reported for the agricultural, metal futures, and stock indices15, and are discussed further.  
4.2.1. Agricultural Futures:   
The estimated results from the DCC model for the same underlying commodity traded in 
multiple markets show the price impact from one market to another, the information flow across 
futures markets, and the dynamic conditional correlation over the markets.  
First look at coffee futures traded in the U.S., UK, Brazil, and Japan.  Table 4 shows that 
the price impact from Brazil to U.S. and UK is significant and stronger than that from U.S. and 
UK.  This result can be explained by the fact that Brazil accounts for 28.9% of world’s coffee 
exports and is the world’s largest producer: see Table 5.  In terms of the cross-market 
information flow, the results indicate that the co-movement effect tends to be bi-directional from 
one market to another.   
The persistence of dynamic conditional correlation process (i.e., DCC-β) for the full 
model (i.e., all coffee futures markets are included) is moderate with a value of 0.635.  This 
implies that the current co-movement of returns is not strongly influenced by the previous 
dynamic correlations as described in equation 6.  Further, the DCC-β estimate for coffee futures 
declines from 0.635 to 0.583 when I exclude the Brazilian market, where information is likely to 
be concentrated.  
                                                 
15 Figures 1 through 9 plot the estimated conditional correlations between markets for the sample period.  Generally, 
the figures indicate that the behavior of these correlations is not constant over time, which justifies the use of the 
DCC modeling structure (see Appendix 4).   
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Table 4  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Coffee Futures Traded in United States, United Kingdom, Brazil, 
and Japan   
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., UK, 
Brazil, and Japan futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  
Panel C shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model.  The 
reduced model for coffee futures includes U.S., UK, and Japan futures markets.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 
1,5,10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
United 
States  
United 
Kingdom  Brazil  Japan 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  2.63e-06  1.59e-04  6.19e-06  3.49e-04 
U.S. market return lag 1  -0.1235a  0.0434a  -2.47e-03  0.6404a 
UK market return lag 1  -0.0312b  -0.0174a  -0.0371a  0.0506a 
BRA market return lag 1  0.1629a  0.0665a  0.0315a  -0.0266 
JPN market return lag 1  -0.0401a  -0.0329a  -0.0268a  -0.0650a 
         
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  1.06e-04a  7.60e-05a  8.23e-05a  2.23e-04a 
GARCH coefficient  0.4190a  0.4898a  0.4369a  0.3219a 
ARCH coefficient  0.1820a  0.1998a  0.1524a  0.1893a 
U.S. market volatility  --  -0.0267a  0.0212a  0.0414a 
UK market volatility   0.1258a  --  0.1366a  0.0534a 
BRA market volatility   0.0164a  0.0896a  --  0.0198 
JPN market volatility   0.1042a  0.0378a  0.1019a  -- 
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
         
Countries   α   β   Log-Likelihood:  
Sample 
Size       
U.S., UK, Brazil, and Japan    0.0631a  0.6352a  25261.10  2277 
U.S., UK, and Japan    0.0568a  0.5828a  17441.60  2277 
         
 
 
Table 5  
World Market of Coffee 
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.    
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
0.14% 17% 0.00 0.00 23.7% 
UK 
 
0.00 2.2% 0.00 0.00 4.3% 
Brazil 
 
33.6% 13.3% 63.8% 28.9% 0.00 
Japan 
 
00.0 5.9% 0.00 0.00 7.8% 
   Source: International Coffee Organization. http://www.ico.org/ 
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Corn futures are traded in the U.S., UK, China, and Japan.  Table 6 shows that the U.S. 
has the strongest price impact on the Chinese, UK, and Japanese markets with a value of 0.096, 
0.048, and 0.190, respectively.  One possible explanation is that the U.S. markets tend to have 
more trading, and control 66.5% of world corn trade (i.e., has a high comparative advantage 
index, calculated by dividing country export by world exports), and that makes it more 
informative.  This is shown in Table 7.  The results also suggest a stronger volatility spillover 
from U.S. to the Chinese, UK, and Japanese corn markets and from China to that of Japan.  This 
result is consistent with the greater liquidity level in the U.S. and China.   
The DCC-β across corn futures in the U.S., UK, China, and Japan is moderate with a 
value of 0.678.  A re-estimated DCC-β value excluding the U.S. is lower at 0.353.  This is 
consistent with the U.S. being the most important market, the most liquid one in term of daily 
trading value, and has the strongest price impact on China, Japan, and UK futures markets.  
Therefore, the information production might be a relevant factor in the dynamic correlation 
across futures markets.  
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Table 6  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Corn Futures Traded in United States, United Kingdom, China, 
and Japan  
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., UK, 
China, and Japan futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  
Panel C shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model.  The 
reduced model for corn futures includes UK, China, and Japan futures markets. a, b, and c refer to significance at 
1,5,10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
United 
State  
United 
Kingdom  China  Japan 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  5.24e-04  5.57e-04c  4.90e-04b  7.81e-04a 
U.S. market return lag 1  -0.087a  0.048b  0.096a  0.1908a 
UK market return  lag 1  -0.09a  0.055a  -0.013  0.0370 
CHN market return lag 1  0.110a  -0.025  8.18e-03a  -0.0661 
JPN market return  lag 1  0.0844a  -0.047c  -3.37e-03  0.0985a 
         
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  7.11e-05a  6.46e-06a  2.93e-05a  4.62e-05a 
GARCH coefficient  0.609a  0.671a  0.033c  0.0557a 
ARCH coefficient  0.171a  0.194a  0.195a  0.5494a 
U.S. market volatility  --  0.033a  0.066a  0.2085a 
UK market volatility   0.096a  --  6.21e-03  -2.75e-03 
CHN market volatility  -7.56e-03  -4.02e-03  --  0.4524a 
JPN market volatility   0.050c  0.073a  0.028a  -- 
         
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
Countries 
 α   β  Log-Likelihood  
Sample 
Size       
U.S., UK, China, and Japan   0.0447a  0.6779a 11584.91 971 
UK, China, and Japan  0.0822a  0.3525b 8942.498 973 
         
 
Table 7  
World Market of Corn 
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.    
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
40% 31.6% 19.1% 66.5% 0.47% 
UK 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 
China 
 
21% 20% 0.30% 0.50% 0.12% 
Japan 
 
0.00 2.3% 0.00 0.00 20.2% 
    Source: Untied States Department of Agriculture (http://www.usda.gov).  
    N/A: Not Available. 
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The market power story also is applicable to soybeans futures traded in the U.S., Brazil, 
China, and Japan.  The soybeans market is dominated by U.S. and Brazil who account for 37% 
and 39% of world soybeans trade, respectively.  Overall, Table 8 indicates that the U.S. has an 
important role in return spillover on the Chinese, Brazilian, and Japanese soybeans markets with 
a value of 0.355, 0.203, and 0.437, respectively.  However, Brazil does not exert a significant 
return spillover to the other markets even though it is a slightly bigger exporter than the U.S., 
possibly explained by its relatively illiquid market.  Table 8 also reveals that the volatility co-
movement from Brazil to China is bi-directional, and it is stronger from Brazil to China.  This 
finding might be explained by the fact that China is a major importer of Brazilian soybeans.  
Additionally, the spillover from U.S. into China and Japan is bi-directional and significant.   
The DCC-β across soybeans futures traded in U.S., China, Japan, and Brazil is moderate 
with a value of 0.704.  Excluding the most informative markets (U.S. and Brazil), the DCC-
β declines to 0.563.  Further, the DCC-β estimate is also lower after excluding either U.S. or 
Brazil markets where most information is produced, e.g. the DCC-β declines from 0.704 to 0.647 
after excluding the U.S. market.  This is expected since Table 9 indicates that the U.S. and Brazil 
markets control 76% of world’s soybeans exports and 63.5% of world production.  To check 
whether the conditional correlation is high between the markets that are arguably most 
informative, I also re-estimate the DCC model for the U.S. and Brazil markets and find a high 
level of persistency between the two markets: 0.979.  This might imply that the informative 
markets are more integrated, or the conditional correlation is strongest in related markets.   
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Table 8 
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Soybeans Futures Traded in United States, China, Japan, and 
Brazil  
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., China, 
Japan, and Brazil futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  
Panel C shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model.  The 
reduced model for soybeans futures includes a) U.S., China, and Japan, b) China and Japan and c) U.S. and Brazil 
futures markets.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
United 
States  China  Japan 
 Brazil 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
      
 
 
Constant term  2.14e-03a  1.30e-03a  1.50e-03a  1.88e-03a 
U.S. market return lag 1  6.21e-04  0.3549a  0.4372a  0.2029a 
CHN market return lag 1  -0.0153  -0.1336b  -0.0137  -0.0318a 
JPN market return  lag 1  -0.0505a  -0.0357a  -0.1748a  -0.0332 
BRA market return  lag 1  0.0248  0.0202  0.0232  -0.0927a 
         
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  5.76e-05a  5.05e-05a  1.00e-04a  2.04e-05a 
GARCH coefficient  0.6109a  0.1172a  0.2667a  0.6643a 
ARCH coefficient  0.0786a  0.0536b  0.2199a  0.1488a 
U.S. market volatility   --  0.0606a  2.53e-03  0.0573a 
CHN market volatility   0.1702a  --  0.7061a  0.0472a 
JPN market volatility   0.0371a  0.0496a  --  -2.84e-03 
BRA market volatility   0.1294a  0.2357a  0.2668a  -- 
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
 
Countries  
 α   β   Log-Likelihood 
 Sample 
Size       
         
U.S., China, Brazil, and Japan    0.0399a  0.7043a  7976.86  682 
U.S., China, and Japan    0.0204b  0.6470a  9699.18  1152 
China and Japan    0.0115a  0.5632a  6061.80  1161 
U.S. and Brazil  0.0183a  0.9799a  4023.403  682 
     
 
Table 9  
World Market of Soybeans 
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.  
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
37.8% 25.7% 28.57 37% 0.00 
China 
 
8.1% 22.7% 0.00 0.00 41% 
Japan 
 
00.0 3.2% 0.00 0.00 6% 
Brazil 
 
25.7% 16.9% 43.8 39% 0.00 
    Source: Untied States Department of Agriculture (http://www.usda.gov).  
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For wheat futures traded in U.S., UK, Canada, and China, the return spillover, as 
presented in Table 10, is significantly unidirectional from U.S. to UK, Canada, and China with a 
value of 0.077, 0.079, and 0.064, respectively.  Stated differently, none of these markets exert a 
significant price influence on the U.S. market.  The results also indicate that the co-movement 
and spillover effect is not bi-directional between all markets.  For example, there is no spillover 
from Canada to China and vice-versa.  The spillover from U.S. to China is uni-directional.  
However, the co-movement from U.S. to UK is bi-directional, suggesting market liquidity plays 
an important role in information transmission (UK is a small player in terms of world trade in 
wheat but has the second most liquid market).  The DCC-β for wheat futures traded in U.S., 
Canada, UK, and China is 0.587, which is lower than the agricultural commodities examined in 
this study.  After excluding the U.S. market that controls 35.3% of world wheat trade (i.e., the 
most important market: see Table 11), the DCC-β declines to 0.394.  I Further check the 
interaction between the two informative markets (U.S. and Canada) and find that the DCC-β is 
high and equal to 0.959.  This is consistent with the fact that U.S. and Canada control 50% of 
world wheat trade. 
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Table 10 
 VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Wheat Futures Traded in United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
and China 
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., Canada, 
UK, and China futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel 
C shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model.  The 
reduced model for wheat futures includes a) UK, Canada, and China, and b) U.S. and Canada futures markets.  a, 
b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, respectively.  
  
 
United 
States  Canada  
United 
Kingdom  China 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  -1.82e-04  6.93e-04c  1.37e-04  5.28e-04 a 
U.S. market return lag 1  -0.0442b  0.0797 a  0.0768 a  0.0644 a 
CAD market return lag 1  -0.0510b  1.3041e-03  -0.0410c  0.0248 
UK market return lag 1  0.0224  -3.8389e-03  0.0540 a  -0.0209 
CHN market return lag 1  -0.0329  -0.1562 a  -0.0521  -0.0827 a 
         
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
        
Constant term  2.23e-05 a  1.42e-04 a  6.58e-05 a  2.55e-05 a 
GARCH coefficient  0.7951a  0.1115 a  0.3147 a  0.5297 a 
ARCH coefficient  0.1334 a  0.0674 a  0.2210 a  0.1711 a 
U.S. market volatility   --  7.12e-03  0.0173 a  4.55e-03 a 
CAD market volatility   1.76e-03  --  6.79e-03  0.0181 a 
UK market volatility   0.0207 a  0.1609 a  --  -0.0180 a 
CHN market volatility   -0.0313b  0.0494  0.3719 a  -- 
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
         
Countries   α   β   Log-Likelihood:  
Sample 
Size       
U.S., UK, Canada, and China  0.0238 a  0.5869 a  12379.83  1043 
UK, Canada, and China  0.0452b  0.394b  9490.16  1043 
U.S. and Canada  0.0189a  0.9592a  5687.41  1043 
  
 
      
    
Table 11  
World Market of Wheat  
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.  
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
11.6% 6% 61.7% 35.3% 2.94% 
Canada 
 
4.11% 1% 69.8% 14.2% 0.28% 
UK 
 
3.1% 2.6% 25.2% 4.78% 1.4% 
China 
 
21.8% 20.2% 2.54% 2.7% 0.15% 
    Source: Untied States Department of Agriculture (http://www.usda.gov).  
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4.2.2.  Metal Futures: 
As stated earlier, this study attempts to analyze the importance of breadth of information.  
Thus it should be noted that the international production and export for metal generally is not 
dominated by a handful of countries, which suggests that information production may not be 
concentrated in a single country.  In contrast, the U.S. tends to be a dominant player in main 
agricultural products.  For example, the top ten copper producing countries account for 70% of 
world production, where as the top five corn producing countries account for 80% of world 
production.  Moreover, the total production reaching the export market for copper is a relatively 
high at 43% compared to only 13% for corn.  The implication of the aforementioned statistics is 
that the interaction between markets is expected to be higher for metal commodities since the 
information production is more diverse and does not concentrate in one country.   
Table 12 displays the results for aluminum futures, traded in U.S., China, and Japan.  The 
Table documents a significant pricing impact of U.S. aluminum futures on the Chinese and 
Japanese aluminum futures markets with values of 0.320 and 0.539, respectively.  However, 
neither Chinese nor Japanese market has a significant price influence over the U.S. market.  The 
Table also reveals that the volatility linkages between China, the U.S and Japan are bi-directional 
and the volatility spillover is stronger from China to the U.S. and Japan markets.  This 
observation might be explained by the greater liquidity level in Chinese aluminum futures 
market.  
The DCC-β estimate across aluminum futures markets is highly significant with a value 
of 0.987.  This means that the interaction of these futures markets is intensive.  In other words, 
such high persistence means that shocks can temporarily make the correlation deviate from its 
long run average, even though the correlation is eventually mean reverting (i.e., the sum of 
{DCC-β + DCC-α} is less than one).  A re-estimated DCC-β for all markets but China shows a 
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decline from 0.987 to 0.979.  This might be due to the fact that the information production is not 
concentrated in any of these markets.  Table 13 indicates that the U.S., China, and Japan markets 
account for only 6.3%, 5.3%, and 3.0% of world’s aluminum exports, respectively.  
For copper futures, the results of the VAR-DCC model are reported in Table 14.  Also 
note that the U.S. and China are the world’s two largest consumers (U.S and China import 14.3% 
and 17.9% of world copper imports -- see Table 15).  The return spillover is only unidirectional 
from U.S. to China, with no feedback effect.  The volatility spillover effect from China into U.S 
is significant and higher than that from U.S. into China.  That is to say, China market has a 
relatively more significant role in the volatility information flow between the two markets.  
These findings support the prior work by Fung, Leung, and Xu (2003) who find that the volatility 
spillover between the U.S. and China for copper futures is stronger from China to the U.S.  The 
DCC-β estimate across copper futures markets is highly significant with a value of 0.991.  This 
means that the two markets are highly correlated.   
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Table 12  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Aluminum Futures Traded in United States, China, and Japan   
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., China, and 
Japan futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel C shows 
the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model. The reduced model 
for aluminum futures includes U.S. and Japan futures markets.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 United States  China  Japan 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
      
Constant term  2.38e-04  2.89e-04  1.31e-04 
U.S. market return lag 1  -0.0885b  0.3201a  0.5395a 
CHN market return lag 1  -0.0104  0.0178a  0.2069 a 
JPN market return lag 1  0.0246  2.25e-03  -0.2106a 
       
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
      
Constant term  2.26e-05a  2.64e-06a  1.08e-05a 
GARCH coefficient  0.7205a  0.7280a  0.6240a 
ARCH coefficient  0.0892a  0.1745a  0.0768a 
U.S. market volatility     7.81e-03a  0.0771a 
CHN market volatility   0.2988a    0.2077a 
JPN market volatility   0.0109  0.0339a   
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
       
Countries 
 α   β  Log-Likelihood Sample Size       
U.S., China, and Japan    6.76e-03a
 
 0.9869a
 
10613.36 1147 
U.S. and Japan    7.81e-03a  0.9796a 13920.11 2263 
       
   
Table 13  
World Market of Aluminum  
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.  
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
6.8% 34% NA 6.3% NA 
China 
 
27.7% 39% NA 5.3% NA 
Japan 
 
0.02% 12% NA 3.0% NA 
   Source: U.S. Geological Survey 2007 
   N/A: Not Available. 
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Table 14  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Copper Futures Traded in United States and China   
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S. and China 
futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel C shows the 
DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, 
respectively.   
 
 United States  China 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
    
Constant term  3.51e-04  5.72e-04b 
U.S. market return lag 1  -0.0867a  0.5842a 
CHN market return lag 1  0.0285  -0.0570a 
     
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
    
Constant term  3.19e-05a  1.12e-05a 
GARCH coefficient  0.8119a  0.7547a 
ARCH coefficient  0.0118a  0.0274a 
U.S. market volatility  --  0.0582a 
CHN market volatility  0.3014a  -- 
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model 
     
α   4.43e-03a   
β  
 0.9911a    
Log-Likelihood:  6601.19
 
    
Sample Size      :  1204     
 
 
Table 15  
World Market of Copper  
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.    
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
4.7% 25.8% 0.00 0.00 14.3% 
China 
 
5.95% 22% 0.00 0.00 17.9% 
   Source: U.S. Geological Survey 2007 
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For gold futures traded in the U.S., China, and Japan, Table 16 shows that the return co-
movement between China and Japan is bi-directional with a stronger return co-movement from 
China to Japan.  Furthermore, there is a strong pricing impact from the U.S. market to the 
Chinese and Japanese gold markets with a value of 0.729 and 0.829, respectively.  The 
coefficient from Japan to U.S. is 0.133.  This might be expected since Table 17 shows that the 
U.S. market controls 23.2% of world gold trade.  In terms of the volatility spillover and co-
movement, the three markets are influencing each other with a strong co-movement from China 
and Japan to the U.S.   
The DCC-β estimate for gold futures 0.933 including all markets, but is substantially 
lower at 0.579 when the U.S. market is excluded.  This is consistent with the U.S. being the most 
important market, has the strongest pricing impact on Chinese and Japanese gold market, and is 
the most liquid market in terms of daily trading value.    
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Table 16  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for Gold Futures Traded in United States, China, and Japan   
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes U.S., China, and 
Japan futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel C shows 
the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model. The reduced model 
for gold futures includes China and Japan futures markets.  a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 United States  China  Japan 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
      
Constant term  4.54e-04  -1.01e-04  1.61e-04 
U.S. market return lag 1  0.0615  0.7297a  0.8287a 
CHN market return lag 1  0.0499  -0.1370a  0.2037a 
JPN market return  lag 1  -0.1326b  -0.1276a  -0.6016a 
       
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
      
Constant term  2.67e-04a  4.87e-06b  9.93e-06a 
GARCH coefficient  -0.0839  0.8242a  0.8450a 
ARCH coefficient  0.1000c  0.0410b  9.59e-04 
U.S. market volatility   ---  0.0237a  0.0476a 
CHN market volatility   0.3449b  --  0.0909a 
JPN market volatility   0.2034b  0.0381a  -- 
       
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
   
Countries  α   β   Log-Likelihood  Sample Size 
U.S., China, and Japan    0.0337  0.9328a  1844.70  212 
China and Japan    -0.048a  0.5793a  1192.67  213 
         
 
 
Table 17  
World Market of Gold  
This table presents the percent of the world’s production and consumption.  The table also lists the ratio of country’s 
export to its production, the ratio of country’s export to the world exports, and the ratio of the country’s import to 
the world imports.    
Market 
 
Production 
% of World 
total 
Consumption 
% of World 
total 
Country 
export/Country 
production 
Country 
export/World 
Exports 
Country 
import/World 
imports 
U.S. 
 
9.4% 16% NA 23.2% 13.5% 
China 
 
10.9% 8.% 0.00 0.003% 0.00 
Japan 
 
0.36% 2% NA 6.0% 4.1% 
   Source: U.S. Geological Survey 2007 
   N/A: Not Available. 
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4.2.3. Stock Index Futures:   
In this section, the return and the volatility linkages as well as the extent of the market 
interactions across futures markets for India Nifty index and Japan Nikkei 225 are estimated.  
Table 18 displays the VAR-DCC results for the Nifty index traded in India and 
Singapore.  The results suggest a strong pricing impact of the Singapore traded Nifty index on 
the India Nifty index.  The Table also indicates the relatively more significant role of Singapore 
market in the volatility information flow from Singapore market to India since the volatility co-
movement effect from Singapore into India is significant, 0.371 and higher than that from India 
into Singapore, 0.168.  These results for the Nifty index are surprising, because it suggests that 
India does not possess information advantage in the Nifty index.  I do not have a satisfactory 
explanation for this result.   
The DCC-β estimate is highly significant for Nifty index with a value of 0.739, showing 
that the correlation between the two markets during the sample period is time varying with a 
moderate level of persistency. 
For the Nikkei 225 traded in Japan, U.S., and Singapore, Table 19 reports a strong pricing 
impact of the U.S. on both the Japan and Singapore-traded Nikkei 225 with a value of 0.414 and 
0.392, respectively, and from Singapore to that of Japan with a value of 0.144.  As for the 
variance equations, the volatility co-movement from Singaporean market to Japanese market 
0.055 is slightly higher than that from Japanese market to Singaporean market 0.047.  Volatility 
spillover between Japan and U.S. markets are also bi-directional with a slightly stronger 
volatility spillover from U.S. 0.046 to Japan market 0.030.  These results suggest that U.S. and 
Singapore markets are more important for Nikkei 225 in terms of information transmission.  As 
in the Nifty index, the results contradict the typical information advantage of the home market.  
A partial explanation might be that the U.S. and Singapore have a large and active group of 
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analysts and futures trading firms.  Alternatively, there might be obstacles in trading, preventing 
information to be fully transferred. 
The DCC-β  parameter for Nikkei 225, is highly significant with a value of 0.968, 
showing that the correlation over the three markets is time varying with high level of persistency 
compared to Nifty index, 0.739.  This might be explained by the Nifty index being a narrow-
based index futures rather than a global one relative to Nikkei 225.  Stated differently, being an 
index of global interest, Nikkei 225 attracts more market interactions.   
The DCC-β estimate for Nikkei 225 traded in Japan, U.S., and Singapore decline from 
0.968 to 0.960 when excluding the home market (i.e., Japan).  That is, when the home market is 
dropped, the correlation persistency does not drop off much, again suggesting a less important 
information role of the Japanese market.  
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Table 18  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Futures Traded in Singapore and India  
 
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes India and 
Singapore futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel C 
shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full. a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Singapore  India 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
 
    
Constant term  1.0576e-03a  1.2960e-03a 
SGP market return lag 1  0.0514a  0.3762a 
IND market return lag 1  0.0678a  -0.2391a 
     
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
 
    
Constant term  5.7085e-05a  1.0268e-05a 
GARCH coefficient  0.5650a  0.5783a 
ARCH coefficient  0.3296a  0.1837a 
SGP market volatility    0.3708a 
IND market volatility  0.1684a   
 
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model 
     
α
 
 0.2193a   
β  
 0.7398a   
     
Log- Likelihood  3702.49   
Sample size  652   
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Table 19  
VAR-DCC Model Estimation Results for the Nikkei 225 Futures Traded in United States, Singapore, and 
Japan  
The table shows the estimates of the VAR-DCC model.  Panel A shows the estimates of the mean return equations 
for the full model (i.e., all markets that trade the underlying commodity).  The full model includes Japan, U.S., and 
Singapore futures markets.  Panel B shows the estimates for the variance equations for the full model.  Panel C 
shows the DCC parameters and model characteristics for both the full model and the reduced model.  The reduced 
model for Nikkei 225 index futures includes U.S. and Singapore futures markets. a, b, and c refer to significance at 
1,5,10% levels, respectively.  
  United States  Singapore  Japan 
Panel A: Mean return equation for the full model 
       
Constant term  3.4422e-04 b  2.1338e-04 a   1.7165e-04 a 
U.S. market lag 1  -0.0704 a  0.3918 a  0.4136 a 
SGP market lag 1  -0.0137  -0.3267 a  0.1435 a 
JPN market lag 1  0.0423a   0.0839 a  -0.3903 a 
       
Panel B: Variance equation for the full model 
       
Constant term  3.9540e-06 a  -4.7437e-08 a  4.1492e-07 
GARCH coefficient  0.8766 a  0.8851a  0.8624a   
ARCH coefficient  0.0798 a  0.0410 a  0.0410a 
U.S. market volatility spillover     0.0343 a  0.0464a 
SGP market volatility spillover  7.2378e-03b    0.0553a 
JPN market volatility spillover  0.0301a  0.0465 a   
  
 
   
Panel C: DCC parameters and model characteristics for the full model and reduced model(s) 
  
 
   
Countries 
 α  β  Log-Likelihood   Sample Size 
Japan, U.S., and Singapore  0.0313 a 0.9679 a 24486.25 2475 
U.S. and Singapore  0.0300 a 0.9604 a 14471.00 2475 
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4.3. Discussions of Overall Results of the DCC Model 
In general, the strength of interaction among the futures markets is higher for metal 
commodities than for agricultural futures commodities; for example, the DCC-β estimate for 
aluminum, copper, and gold is high with a value of 0.987, 0.991, and 0.933, respectively, 
whereas the DCC-β  for coffee, corn, soybeans, and wheat is moderate with a value of 0.635, 
0.678, 0.704, and 0.587, respectively.  One possible explanation is that the metal production is 
not concentrated in a few countries, while the U.S. has a strong influence in worldwide 
agricultural export.  The relatively high interaction in metals, captured by their high DCC-β, is in 
agreement with the breadth of information being a relevant factor in the extent of market 
interactions.  For metals, the information linkage also tends to be bi-directional.  This would be 
consistent with the notion that when the information required to price the metal commodities is 
more diverse, the degree of market interaction is greater.   
  The results from the mean returns and variance equations indicate that markets with the 
greater information production have an important role in returns and volatility spillover across 
futures markets.  For example, U.S. controls 66.5% of the world corn trade.  Thus, the prices in 
international export market for corn are mostly determined by U.S. market.  Indeed, I find that, 
for a country whose exports dominate the world trade market tends to be the market that has the 
leadership role in return transmission and tends to be more informative.  However, for the two 
stock indices examined here, the results suggest that the home country is not the most influential, 
a curious result that deserves further investigation in the future.  
  The informative markets play a substantial role in the interaction between markets.  
Specifically, I find that the persistency in conditional correlation is lower when the informative 
market(s) is excluded from the estimation.  For example, the DCC-β across corn futures markets 
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in the U.S., UK, China, and Japan declines from 0.678 to 0.353 when the U.S. market is 
excluded.  This suggests that the breadth of information plays a role in the degree of interaction.  
The results also indicate that the interaction between the more informative markets is 
significantly high.  For example, the persistence of dynamic conditional correlation process for 
wheat futures traded in U.S. and Canada (i.e., the most informative markets) is high and equal to 
0.959.  As another example, the DCC-β between the most informative markets in soybeans -- 
U.S. and Brazil -- reflects a high level of persistency: 0.979.  This implies that the dynamic 
conditional correlation is greater in closely related markets.    
4.4. Results for Price Discovery in Futures Markets:   
This section presents the estimates of contribution to price discovery.  Note that the 
model -- Vector Error Correction Models given by equations (12) and (13)—can only be applied 
to markets trading at the same time.  Therefore, the results here are performed on a small set of 
commodities.  Table 20 presents the results.  The market that has the lowest adjustment 
coefficient (τ ) has the largest contribution to the price discovery process, which is consistent 
with Schwarz and Szakmary, 1994; Korczak and Phylaktis, 2007.  Table 20 also provides a 
summary of the co-integrating vectors that are estimated using the Johansen methodology.  
For wheat futures that are traded on MGE of U.S. and WCE of Canada, the adjustment 
coefficients are significant; this implies that MGE and WCE contribute to price discovery.  The 
adjustment coefficient for U.S. has a negative sign -0.0003 compared to a positive sign 0.0097 
for the Canadian market.  The Canadian share in price discovery is trivial 2.5%, showing the 
price impact of Canadian prices is less than that of the U.S. prices.  These results are consistent 
with the VAR-DCC findings that U.S. has a relatively more significant role in the volatility 
information flow and pricing impact in wheat futures markets.  
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For aluminum futures, the adjustment coefficients for China and Japan are significant at 
the 1% level, which implies a bi-directional response to deviations from the equilibrium.  Thus, 
both markets contribute to price discovery.  Table 20 shows that the adjustment coefficient for 
China market is negative and significant -0.0011, while the adjustment coefficient of Japan is 
positive and significant 0.0390.  The share of China in price discovery is 97.4%, showing that 
China has a greater futures price leadership over the Japan market.  This means that Japanese 
prices are influenced much more by Chinese prices than the Chinese prices are influenced by 
Japanese prices.  These findings are in agreement with the VAR-DCC results that China has a 
relatively more significant role in the volatility information flow and pricing impact.  
For the Nifty index, the adjustment coefficients for India Nifty index and Singapore 
traded Nifty index are significant at the level of 10%.  This finding implies that Singaporean 
prices respond to deviations from the Indian prices, and Indian prices respond to deviations from 
the Singaporean prices.  Both Singaporean and India markets contribute to price discovery.  
Specifically, the adjustment coefficient for India Nifty index has a negative sign -0.0602 
compared to a positive 0.0017 for the Singaporean market.  On the basis of these adjustment 
coefficients, the Singapore share in the price discovery process using equation (14) is equal to 
97.2%.  The extent to which Indian prices respond to Singaporean prices is substantial and 
implies that Singapore has a larger role in the price discovery process of the Nifty index market.  
This finding is consistent with the earlier VAR-DCC results that Singapore has a relatively more 
significant role in the volatility information flow and pricing impact.  In both indices, the home 
country does not appear to have information advantage.  Possible but not completely satisfactory 
explanations are that these home countries have lower liquidity or greater trading obstacles.   
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Table 20  
Vector Error Correction Models Coefficients and the ith Market Contribution to the Price Discovery Process 
Contract  Cointegration 
equation  
Error correction term 
coefficient  
ith market contribution in price 
discovery  
ith market contribution in price 
discovery 
Wheat 
 
..SUυ
 
1.000  ..SUτ  
-0.00025a 
 
CADSU
SU
SUCAD
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
..
..
..
 
0.025 CADSU
CAD
CADSU
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
..
..
 0.975 
 
CADυ
 
-0.851c 
 
 
CADτ  
0.00969a 
 
Aluminum 
 
CHNυ
 
1.000  CHNτ  
-0.00105a 
 
JPNCHN
CHN
CHNJPN
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
 
0.026 
 
JPNCHN
JPN
JPNCHN
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
 
 
0.974 
 
 
JPNυ
 
-0.656b 
 
 
JPNτ  
0.038977a 
 
S&P CNX 
Nifty Index 
 
INDυ
 
1.000  INDτ  
-0.0602c 
 
SGPIND
IND
INDSGP
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
 
0.972 SGPIND
SGP
SGPIND
ττ
τ
+
=Θ →
 
0.028 
 
SGPυ
 
-1.006a 
 
 
SGPτ  
0.0017c 
 
    a, b, and c refer to significance at 1,5,10% levels, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the interaction across futures markets for a large set of commodities 
and financial futures.  I hypothesize that the more diverse the information production, the more 
likely there is inter-market information transfer.  The analysis utilizes the dynamic conditional 
correlation developed by Engle (2002) to examine the interaction across world futures markets 
and commodities.  Specifically, the study estimates the time varying correlation between daily 
futures market returns and investigates the returns and volatility linkages for different groups of 
commodity and financial futures. The study is more comprehensive than prior literature in terms 
of the number of markets and commodities; this allows a richer set of testing.   
The primary finding is that the market interactions are relatively high for commodities 
where information production is more diverse (metal commodities), and lower for commodities 
where information is more concentrated (agricultural commodities).  Furthermore, the market 
interaction is lower after excluding the most informative market(s) from the model.  For 
example, the DCC-β across corn futures markets in the U.S., UK, China, and Japan is 0.678; in 
contrast, DCC-β excluding the U.S. (the most informative one) is much lower at 0.353. 
The study also estimates the contribution of futures market to price discovery by utilizing 
the Vector Error Correction Models.  Examining price discovery deepens our understanding of 
price leadership across futures markets.  For instance, I find that Canada’s share in price 
discovery for wheat futures is only 2.5%, while that of the U.S. is much greater.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Commodity and Financial Futures Contract Specifications 
Appendix 1-A: Coffee Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 Coffee Futures 
Markets U.S. UK Brazil Japan 
 
Trading 
Market 
 
 
New York 
Mercantile 
Exchange 
(NYMEX/ CSCE) 
 
 
LIFFE CONNECT® 
(London) 
 
 
 
 
Brazilian Mercantile 
& Futures Exchange 
(BM&F) 
 
Tokyo Grain 
Exchange (TGE) 
 
Unit 
 
U.S. cents per 
pounds. 
U.S. dollars per tonne U.S. dollars per 60  
kilogram 
Japanese Yen per 
bag (69 kilograms) 
Contract Size 
 
37,500 pounds Five tonnes 6,000 kilograms 50 bags (3,450 
kilograms) 
Deliverable 
Grades 
 up to 150 defects per 
500 g at basis; 151 -
250 defects per 500 g 
at a discount of 
U.S.$15/ tonne; 251 - 
350 defects /500 g at a 
discount of U.S.$30/ 
tonne; or 351 - 450 
defects per 500 g at a 
discount of U.S.$45/ 
tonne.  
 
Green coffee beans 
produced in Brazil, 
variety coffea 
arabica, type six or 
better, good cup or 
better, 
The following 
washed arabica 
coffee satisfying the 
terms and conditions 
stipulated in the 
Exchange rules: 
Mexico (Prime 
Washed), 
Guatemala (Extra 
Prime Washed) El 
Salvador (Central 
Standard), Costa 
Rica (Hard Bean) 
Honduras (High 
Grown), Nicaragua 
(Strictly High 
Grown) 
 
Last Trading 
Day 
One business day 
prior to last notice 
day. 
Last business day of 
the delivery month at 
12:30 
The sixth business 
day proceeding the 
last day of the 
delivery month.  
 
Ten business days 
prior to the last 
business day of the 
delivery month. 
Trading Hours 
(Local) 
8:30 am – 2:00 
pm(Mon – Fri) 
 
 
08:00 - 17:30 10:00 am – 15:30 pm 9:30 am - 11:30 am,  
1:30 pm - 3:30 pm 
 
Contract 
Months 
Mar, May, Jul, 
Sept, Dec for the 
next 23 months 
 
Jan,  Mar, May, Jul, 
Sept, Nov  
Mar, May, Jul, Sept, 
Nov 
Jan,  Mar, May, Jul, 
Sept, Nov 
  Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-B: Corn Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 Corn Futures 
Markets U.S. UK Japan China 
 
Trading 
Market 
 
 
Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) 
 
 
LIFFE CONNECT® 
(London) 
 
 
Kansai Commodity 
Exchange (KCX) 
 
 
Dalian Commodity 
Exchange (DCE) 
Unit 
 
Cents per bushels Euro per metric tone Japanese Yen per  
ton 
China Yuan per 
metric ton 
Contract 
Size 
5,000 bushels 50 metric tons 50 ton 10 metric tons 
Deliverable 
Grades 
No. 2 Yellow at par, 
No. 1 yellow at 1 1/2 
cents per bushel over 
contract price, No. 3 
yellow at 1 1/2 cents 
per bushel under 
contract price 
Yellow and/or red 
corn, of sound, fair 
and merchantable 
quality of the 
following standard:  
Moisture (15%- 
15.5%) Broken grain 
(4%- 10%) Sprouted 
grain (2.5%-6%) 
Grain admixture 
(4%- 5%) Other 
impurities (1%- 3%)  
 
Yellow corn 
produced in U.S. 
Corn at Par is Subject 
to DCE Corn 
Delivery Quality 
Standard 
Last 
Delivery 
Day 
Second business day 
following the last 
trading day of the 
delivery month. 
The fifth calendar 
day of the delivery 
month. If not a 
business day, then 
the first following 
business day 
 
 
Last business day 
two months prior to 
the delivery month. 
In December, the 
last trading day is 
the third to last 
Business day. 
 
Second day after the 
last trading day of the 
delivery month 
Trading 
Hours 
(Local) 
9:30 am - 1:15 pm 
 
10:45 am - 18.30 pm 9:20, 10:20, 11:20 
am 1:20, 2:20, 3:20 
pm 
9:00 am - 11:30 am,  
1:30 pm - 3:00 pm 
 
Contract 
Months 
Dec, Mar, May, Jul, 
Sep 
 
Nov, Jan, Mar, Jun, 
Aug 
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, 
Oct, Dec 
Jan, Mar, May, July, 
Sep, Nov 
    Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-C: Soybeans Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 Soybeans Futures 
Markets U.S. Japan China Brazil 
 
Trading 
Market 
 
 
Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) 
 
 
Tokyo Grain 
Exchange 
(TGE) 
 
Dalian Commodity 
Exchange (DCE) 
Brazilian 
Mercantile & 
Futures Exchange 
(BM&F) 
Unit 
 
U.S. Cents per 
 bushel 
Japanese Yen per 
tonne 
Chinese Yuan per Ton 
 
U.S. dollars per 60  
kilogram 
Contract 
Size 
 
5,000 bushels 50 Metric Tons 
10 Ton 27 tonnes 
Deliverable 
Grades 
No. 2 Yellow at par, 
No. 1 yellow at 6 
cents per bushel over 
contract price and 
No. 3 yellow at 6 
cents per bushel 
under contract price 
No. 2 yellow 
soybeans produced in 
the U.S. and yellow 
soybeans produced in 
the Federative 
Republic of Brazil 
and the Republic of 
Paraguay that satisfy 
the terms and 
conditions stipulated 
in the Exchange 
Rules  
 
No. 3 yellow with 
purity rate above 91%  
and No. 1 yellow with 
purity rate above 96%, 
No. 2 yellow with 
purity 93.5%, No. 4 
yellow with purity 
above 88.5% 
 
The soybeans shall 
be physiologically 
developed, healthy, 
clean, dry and free 
from foreign odors 
which are 
inappropriate to the 
commodity 
Last Trading 
Day 
The business day 
prior to the 15th 
calendar day of the 
contract month. 
Fifteenth calendar 
day of the delivery 
month; if that day is 
not a business day, 
then the last trading 
day is moved up to 
the nearest business 
day. 
 
10th Trading Day of 
the Delivery Month 
The ninth business 
day proceeding the 
first day of the 
delivery month. On 
that day, neither 
opening of new 
short 
positions nor day 
trading shall be 
allowed 
Trading 
Hours 
(Local) 
9:30 am - 1:15 pm 
 
10:00 am - 11:30 am;  
01:00 pm - 2:30 pm 
 
9:00 am - 11:30 am  
1:30 pm - 3:00 pm 
 
9:00 am – 14:30 
Contract 
Months 
Sep, Nov, Jan, Mar, 
May, Jul, Aug 
 
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, 
Oct, Dec Jan, Mar, May, July, Sep, Nov 
Mar Apr, May, 
Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep,  
Nov. 
    Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-D: Wheat Futures Commodity Contract Specifications  
 
Wheat futures 
Markets U.S. Canada UK China 
Trading 
Market 
Minneapolis Grain 
Exchange (MGE) 
Winnipeg 
Commodity 
Exchange (WCE) 
LIFFE CONNECT® 
(London) 
 
Zhengzhou 
Commodity 
Exchange (ZCE) 
Unit Cents per bushel Canadian dollar  per tone U.S. Dollars per tone 
Chinese Yuan per 
ton 
Contract 
Size 5,000 bushels 20 tonnes. 100 tonnes 10 tons 
Deliverable 
Grades 
No. 2 or better 
Northern Spring 
Wheat with a protein 
content of 13.5% or 
higher, with 13% 
protein deliverable at a 
discount. 
Any unlicensed 
variety of red wheat 
or licensed variety 
of red wheat as 
defined by the 
Canadian Grain 
Commission 
Sound and sweet and 
in good condition and 
to contain no more 
than 3% heat 
damage. Natural 
weight to be not less 
than 72.5 kg per 
hectoliter. Moisture 
content not to exceed 
15% 
2nd grade strong 
gluten wheat 
Last Trading 
Day 
The business day 
preceding the fifteenth 
calendar day of that 
contract month 
The fifteenth 
calendar day of the 
delivery month. 
The 23rd calendar day 
of delivery month 
The seventh 
business day prior 
to the last trading 
day in the contract 
month 
Trading 
Hours 
(Local) 
10:30 am - 2:15 pm  9:30 am – 1:15 pm 10:00 am – 04:15 pm 9:00 am -11:30 pm 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm 
Contract 
Months 
Mar, May, Jul, Sept, 
Dec 
Mar, May, Jul, Oct, 
Dec 
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, 
Nov 
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, 
Sep, Nov 
    Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-E: Aluminum Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 Aluminum Futures 
Markets U.S. Japan China 
 
Trading Market 
 
 
New York Mercantile 
Exchange 
(NYMEX/ COMEX) 
 
 
The Tokyo Commodity 
Exchange (TCE) 
 
Shanghai Futures 
Exchange (SHFE) 
Unit 
 
U.S. dollar per pound Japanese Yen per kg China  Yuan  per ton  
Contract Size 
 
44,000 pounds  10 tonnes  5 ton 
Deliverable 
Grades 
Aluminum of 99.7% purity 
with a maximum iron 
content of 0.20% and a 
maximum silicon content of 
0.10%. 
 
Aluminum of minimum 
99.70% purity with maximum 
permissible iron content 
0.20% and silicon content 
0.10% 
Aluminum  99.7% purity 
 
Last Trading Day The third to last business 
day of the delivery month. 
 
The third business day prior to 
the delivery day 
The 15th day of the spot 
month (postponed if legal 
holidays) 
 
Trading Hours 
(Local) 
7:50 am - 1:15 pm 
(Mon – Fri) 
 
9:00 am - 11:00 am , 
 12:30 pm - 3:30 pm 
9:00 am - 11:30 am,  
1:30 pm - 3:00 pm 
 
Contract Months Four consecutive months 
 
All even months within a year January to December 
 Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-F: Copper Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 
Copper Futures 
Markets U.S. China 
 
Trading Market 
 
 
New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX/ COMEX) 
 
 
Shanghai Futures 
Exchange (SHFE) 
Unit 
 
U.S. cents per pound. Chinese Yuan per ton 
Contract Size 
 
25,000 pounds. 5 ton 
Deliverable 
Grades 
Grade 1 electrolytic copper conforming to 
the specification as to chemical and 
physical requirements, as adopted by the 
American Society for Testing and 
Materials, and of a brand approved and 
listed by the Exchange 
 
Standard Copper Cathode, 
Copper+Silver≥99.95%, High grade 
Copper or  the LME Registered Brand 
Last Delivery Day The first delivery day is the first business 
day of the delivery month; the last delivery 
day is the last business day of the delivery 
month. 
 
16th –20th of the spot month 
(postponed in case of legal holidays) 
Trading Hours 
(Local) 
8:10 am - 1:00 pm 
(Mon – Fri) 
 
9:00 am - 11:30 am, 
1:30 pm - 3:00 pm 
 
Contract Months Trading is conducted for delivery during the 
current calendar month and the next 23 
consecutive calendar months. 
 
January to December 
    Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1-G: Gold Futures Commodity Contract Specifications 
 
Gold Futures 
Market U.S. Japan China 
 
Trading Market 
 
 
New York Mercantile 
Exchange 
(NYMEX/ COMEX) 
 
 
The Tokyo Commodity 
Exchange (TCE) 
 
Shanghai Futures 
Exchange (SHFE) 
Unit 
 
U.S. dollars per troy ounce. Japanese Yen per gram China Yuan  per gram 
Contract Size 
 
100 troy ounces. 1 kilogram 1 kilogram 
Deliverable 
Grades 
Not less than 0.995 fineness,  Gold of minimum 
99.99% fineness 
Gold with fineness not less 
than 99.95%  
 
Last Trading Day The close of business on the 
third to last business day of 
the maturing delivery 
month. 
 
The third business day 
preceding the Delivery 
Day 
The 15th day of the spot 
month (postponed if legal 
holidays) 
Trading Hours 
(Local) 
8:20 am - 1:30 pm 
(Mon – Fri) 
 
9:00 am - 11:00 am;  
12:30 pm - 5:30 pm 
 
9:00 am - 11:30 am 
1:30 pm - 3:00 pm 
 
Contract Months Any Feb, Apr, Aug, and Oct 
falling within a 23-month 
period; and any Jun and Dec 
falling within a 60-month 
period beginning with the 
current month. 
 
All even months within a 
year  
January to December 
   Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 1- H: Financial Futures Contract Specifications 
 S&P CNX Nifty Index 
 
Nikkei 225 
Markets Singapore India  U.S. Japan Singapore 
 
Trading 
market 
 
Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) 
 
National 
Stock 
Exchange of 
India (NSI) 
  
Chicago 
Mercantile 
Exchange 
(CME) 
 
 
Osaka 
Securities 
Exchange 
(OSE) 
 
Singapore 
Exchange 
(SGX) 
Unit 
 
points points  points points points 
Contract 
Size 
 
$ 2 times S&P 
CNX Nifty Index 
INR 100 
times S&P 
CNX Nifty 
Index 
 $5 times the 
Nikkei Stock 
Average 
 
Nikkei 225 x 
¥1,000 
¥500 x Nikkei 
225 Index 
Futures Price 
Settle 
method 
 
Cash settlement Cash 
settlement 
 Cash Settled Cash 
Settlement 
Cash settlement 
Trading 
hours 
(Local) 
9:00 am – 18:15 9:55-15:30  8:00 am to 3:15 
pm 
9:00 - 11:00, 
12:30 - 15:10, 
16:30 - 
b19:00 
7:45 am – 2:30 
pm        
 
Contract 
months 
2 nearest serial 
months and 4 
quarterly months 
on March, June, 
September and 
December cycle. 
3-month 
trading cycle 
- the near 
month (one), 
the next 
month (two) 
and the far 
month 
(three). 
 
 Four months in 
the March 
Quarterly 
Cycle. Mar, 
Jun, Sep, Dec. 
 
5 months in 
the March 
quarterly 
cycle: Mar, 
Jun, Sep, Dec  
 
3 nearest serial 
months & 5 
nearest 
quarterly 
months 
        Contract specification is based on availability on Dec. 2008 
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Appendix 2: Conversion Unit 
The table consolidates the quotation units for the data series into U.S unit and adjusts the daily prices to U.S. dollars 
using daily exchange rate provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
Market 
 
Home Market Quotation Unit Conversion Factor 
Agricultural Futures: Coffee Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. cents per bound $cents/U.S. 100
1
 
UK 
 
U.S. dollar per tonne lbtonne /0045.0  
Brazil 
 
U.S. dollar per 60 kg lbkg /45.060
1
×
 
Japan 
 
Japanese Yen per 69 kg Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
kg/lb 0.45
×
69
1
 
Agricultural Futures: Corn Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. cents per bushels $cents/U.S. 100
1  
UK 
 
Euro per tonne Euro/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel tonne/corn 0.025
 
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per tonne Yuan/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel tonne/corn 0.025
 
Japan 
 
Japanese Yen per ton Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel ton/corn 0.028
 
Agricultural Futures: Soybeans Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. cents per bushels $cents/U.S. 100
1  
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per ton Yuan/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel nston/soybea 0.03
 
Japan 
 
Japanese Yen per tonne Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel eanstonne/soyb 0.027  
Brazil 
 
U.S. dollar per 60 kg  bushel skg/soybean 27.22×60
1
 
Agricultural Futures: Wheat Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. cents per bushels $cents/U.S. 100
1
 
Canada 
 
Canadian Dollar per tonne CD/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel ttonne/whea 0.027
 
UK 
 
GBP per tonne  GBP/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel ttonne/whea 0.027
 
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per ton Yuan/U.S.$ rate Exchange
bushel ton/wheat 0.03
  
Metal Futures: Aluminum Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. dollar per pound -- 
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per ton Yuan/U.S.$ rate Exchange
ton/lb 0.0005
 
Japan 
 
Japanese Yen per Kg Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
kg/lb 0.45
 
Metal Futures: Gold Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. dollar per troy ounce -- 
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per gram Yuan/US$ rate Exchange
gram/ounce 31.103
 
Japan 
 
Japanese Yen per gram Yen/US$ rate Exchange
gram/ounce 31.103
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Appendix 2 continued  
 Market 
 
Home Market Quotation Unit Conversion Factor 
Metal Futures: Copper Contracts 
U.S. 
 
U.S. cents per pound $cents/U.S. 100
1
 
China 
 
Chinese Yuan per ton Yuan/U.S.$ rate Exchange
ton/lb 0.0005  
Financial Futures: S&P CNX (India) Nifty Index Contracts
Singapore 
 
points index  $2×
 India 
 
points INR/U.S.$ rate Exchange
index  100 ×
 
Financial Futures: Nikkei 225 Contracts
U.S. 
 
points index  $5×
Singapore 
 
points Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
index  500 ×
 
Japan 
 
points Yen/U.S.$ rate Exchange
index  1000 ×
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Appendix 3: Trading Hours in Greenwich Mean Time for Futures Markets 
Nikkei 255 Index S&P CNX (India) Nifty Index 
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. Singapore Japan 
U.S. 14:00 – 21:15 --   
Singapore 23:55 - 06:25 No --  
Japan 00:00 - 02:00 
03:30 - 06:10 No Y -- 
 
Countries Times (GMT) Singapore India 
Singapore 02:00-10:15 --  
India 03:55-10:30 Y -- 
 
Gold Aluminum 
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. China Japan 
U.S. 13:20 – 18:30 --   
China  01:00 - 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00 No --  
Japan 00:00 - 02:00 
03:30 - 06:30 No Y -- 
 
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. China Japan 
U.S. 12:50 – 18:15 --   
China  01:00 - 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00 No --  
Japan 00:00 - 02:00 
03:30 - 06:30 No Y -- 
 
Copper  Wheat  
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. China 
U.S. 12:50 – 18:15 --  
China  01:00 - 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00 No -- 
 
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. Canada UK China 
U.S. 13:30 –17:15 --    
Canada 13:30 –17:15 Y --   
UK 10:00 – 16:15 Y Y --  
China 01:00 – 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00 
No No No -- 
 
Coffee  Corn  
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. Japan UK Brazil 
U.S. 13:30 – 19:00 --    
Japan 00:30 - 01:30 
04:30 - 06:30 
No --   
UK 08:00 - 17:30 Y No --  
Brazil 12:00 - 17:30 Y No Y -- 
 
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. UK China Japan 
U.S. 15:30 – 19:15 --    
UK 10:45 -  18:30 Y --   
China  01:00 - 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00  No No --  
Japan 00:30 - 02:00 
04:00 - 06:00 No No Y -- 
 
Soybeans  
Countries Times (GMT) U.S. China Japan Brazil 
U.S. 15:30 – 19:15 --    
China  01:00 - 03:30 
05:30 – 07:00 
No --   
Japan 01:00 - 03:30 
04:00 - 05:30 
No Y --  
Brazil 13:00 - 18:30 Y No No -- 
 
 
  No: There is no overlapping in trading hours      Y: There is overlapping in timing  
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Appendix 4: Dynamic Conditional Correlation Plots 
Figure 1: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Coffee Futures 
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Figure 2: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Corn Futures 
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Figure 3: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Soybeans Futures 
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Figure 4: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Wheat Futures 
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Figure 5: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Aluminum Futures 
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Figure 6: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Copper Futures 
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Figure 7: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Gold Futures 
   
Gold: U.S. and China 
 
Gold: U.S. and Japan 
 
Gold: China and Japan 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for S&P CNX Nifty Index Futures 
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Figure 9: Time-Varying Correlations between Daily Futures Market Returns for Financial Futures 
Nikkei 225: U.S. and Singapore 
 
Nikkei 225: Singapore and Japan 
 
Nikkei 225: U.S. and Japan 
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